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Executive Summary 
The purpose of both the quantitative and qualitative research elements of this project was to 
ascertain the incidence of internationalisation activity among independent German and UK 
high tech young firms.  The research charted the occurence, degree and speed of internation-
alisation by comparison to a ‘matched sample’ of non-internationalising firms.  Internationali-
sation characteristics were then related to the performance of the firms as measured by sales 
and employment growth. 
Key findings 
• The majority of UK and German high tech young firms will have international sales. For the typi-
cal high tech firm, it is not a question of whether, but when, to internationalise. 
• German and British high tech young firms internationalise quickly after formation. A quarter of 
the sample internationalised in their first year. 80% of the sample will have internationalised by 
the 10th anniversary of their founding. 
• Internationally active firms are associated with higher performance than domestic-only firms 
when measured by sales and employment growth and labour productivity. 
• Firm age, size at start-up, regular R&D activity, and founders with international experience prior 
to start-up are each strongly and positively linked with a greater likelihood of internationalisa-
tion. 
• Firms with highly customised products or firms which specialise in software activities are each 
less likely to internationalise. 
• UK high-tech start-ups have on average higher levels of international sales than their German 
counterparts despite the latter internationalising more quickly. 
• The degree of internationalisation of a firm is influenced by its management’s experience of inter-
nationalisation and by the firm’s level of co-operation with foreign partners. A firm with more ex-
perience of international sales also has a greater level of international sales. 
• Europe is the primary regional focus for exports from German and UK firms. However, America 
is the most popular destination for UK exports. France is the most popular country for German 
exports. 
• The founder managers of German young high tech firms are generally more risk averse than their 
UK counterparts. Their choice of export strategies is consistent with this greater risk aversion. 
• Exporting directly or via a distributor are the two most common modes of internationalisation for 
German and UK high tech young firms and represent over 70% of all contemporary market en-
tries. 
• Young firms experience a ‘liability of alienness’ when trying to sell to major foreign buyers. By 
this term we mean that large firms are unwilling to purchase directly from young firms with little 
reputation or track record. This barrier tends to oblige young high tech firms to use distributors 
despite this channel likely being a more costly alternative to direct sales activity. 
• Venture capitalists are confirmed as good at spotting ‘winners’.  Their finance and advice raise 
the labour productivity of investee firms  but do not significantly increase the rate of internation-
Contents LBS / ZEW 
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alisation or rapid growth unless the firm has already decided to internationalise.  The positive ef-
fect of venture capital advice on performance is more evident in UK firms. 
• Public grants or subsidies have little positive impacts on sales or employment measures of firm 
performance. There remains a wide disparity in the knowledge of, or interest in, available grant 
schemes among young high tech firms. 
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Preface to the AGF Report 
There is now a growing tradition of Anglo-German comparative research on new technology-based 
firms (NTBFs).  Two of the most influential studies in this area have both been sponsored by the An-
glo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society (AGF).  Starting in 1977, the first AGF 
project on NTBFs - New Technology-Based Firms in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of 
Germany - which was carried out by the consultancy firm Arthur D. Little, has been one of the most 
influential early contributions in the field.  This report was the first public document to use the term 
‘new technology-based firm’ and to provide a definition, which despite its operational limitations sub-
sequently became an established term in the literature.  More importantly, this study represented one 
of the first serious attempts to survey of the existing stock of this type of firm.  It emphasised that, in 
comparison with the USA, Germany and the UK were each lagging behind if judged by the rate of 
formation of NTBFs and in their total contribution to the overall economic activity of both countries.  
In terms of a policy contribution, this study was instrumental in highlighting the lack of support infra-
structures for the genesis and growth of high-tech start-ups in two of Europe’s leading economies.  
Given European policy makers’ contemporary concerns with international competitiveness in knowl-
edge-based industries (see for example the UK government’s White Paper on Competitiveness, DTI 
1998), the 1977 AGF report was prescient in its exclusive focus on that category of new firms which is 
now widely regarded as having a critical role in enhancing the continued innovativeness of a devel-
oped economy. 
The picture painted ten years later was a more optimistic one.  A joint project, again co-funded by the 
Anglo-German Foundation, involved the Institut für Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung (ISI) of 
the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft and the UK consultancy Segal, Quince and Wickstead (Anglo-German 
Foundation 1988).  While more limited in scope and relying mainly on secondary data sources, this 
study - New Technology Based Firms in Britain and Germany - set another milestone.  It reported a 
significant growth in the number of high-tech start-ups being formed in both countries, albeit with a 
more developed NTBF sector in the UK relative to the size of its economy.  Less encouragingly, the 
1988 AGF report continued to corroborate the key finding of the earlier Arthur D. Little study. 
The present (and third) report - The Rapid Internationalisation of High Tech Young Firms in Germany 
and the United Kingdom - can be seen as continuing in the same tradition and is a direct successor to 
these previous projects.  Its subject continues to be NTBFs in Germany and the UK.  However, the 
present report specifically concentrates on the processes and implications of the internationalisation of 
technology-based young firms.  In an increasingly interdependent world economy, the study of how 
firms internationalise both their markets and the means of production has become a major part of the 
canon of business studies.   
This 2000 AGF report demonstrates that international sales activity is not the exception but, statisti-
cally, is the norm for UK and German NTBFs. While young and small firms are generally character-
ised as less likely than older or larger firms to undertake overseas sales activity, technology-based 
young firms are seen to present a major and important qualification to this rule.  The dynamics and 
speed of foreign market entry of NTBFs are typically of an order faster than their more established or 
less technology-focused firm counterparts.  Indeed, these European firms, when matched by age and 
sector, are likely to be more international or even on occasions more global than their NTBF counter-
parts in the US.   
The subject matter and findings of this report are highly germane to the present debate on the competi-
tiveness of European economies. One particular contemporary concern of policy makers is the dearth 
of large companies which have been born of major technological developments in the last twenty 
years. With very few exceptions, Europe has negligible equivalents to the global technological giants 
of Microsoft, Oracle, Dell, Cisco  AOL etc. that seemed to have found such a conducive start-up and 
rapid growth environment in the USA.  Thus, national policy makers have become interested not only 
in the numbers of new firm formed but also in how many of these firms will continue to enjoy rapid 
growth over several years in order to have a chance of reaching major international importance.   
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Objectives of the Research Project 
The research project had four related and highly specific objectives: 
Firstly, the authors wished to ascertain in detail the degree of internationalisation activities among 
NTBFs in Germany and the UK.  The present study is, to our knowledge, the largest empirical study 
of its kind undertaken with German and British NTBFs.  Anecdotally, is not difficult to appreciate the 
international scope and experience of those managers and scientists who create and work in NTBFs.  
However, anecdote is an insufficient foundation for analysis.  Subjective impression can now be cor-
roborated with substantial quantitative and qualitative data across two major European economies. 
Secondly, the authors sought to go beyond descriptive statistics to look at causal relationships. By us-
ing a ‘matched sample’ methodology, the Anglo-German research team was able to ascertain a num-
ber of firm characteristics which can be successfully used to discriminated between companies which 
did internationalise and those which did not.  Econometric analyses allowed the data to be interrogated 
in order to link the firm’s predisposition for international activity to a number of contemporary and 
competitive theories in business strategy. 
Thirdly, by linking causal relationships to a more detailed investigation of the alternative modes of in-
ternationalisation chosen by both German and British young firms, the researchers desired to be able 
to build up a level of knowledge of direct value and applicability to young firms seeking to interna-
tionalise for the first time.  The findings drawn from the survey and interview information were not re-
stricted to issues only of academic and theoretical interest.  The research team was mindful that infor-
mation of practicable and pragmatic advantage to NTBFs or their advisors was of equal value to ob-
servations of purely theoretical importance.  To ensure the validity of the wider survey findings, forty 
case studies were undertaken with selected and matched survey respondents.  By this means, the gen-
eralised conclusions from the survey material could be explored, challenged or corroborated by de-
tailed debate with owner- managers of NTBFs.  The resultant findings, which will be communicated to 
NTBFs and especially the respondents who participated in the survey, will also be made available to 
the wider business community.  One important group within this community will be the small business 
advisers and other public advisory bodies interested in fostering high tech enterprise.  It is for this rea-
son that both the German and British industry ministries are directly or indirectly sponsors to this re-
search. 
And finally, the over-arching objective of the project was to undertake cross-country research of the 
highest level of academic rigour, as judged by our peers and sponsors, while at the same time being of 
direct and material value to the founders and managers of NTBFs, small business advisers and indus-
trial policy makers in the host countries of the United Kingdom and Germany.   
It is up to our readers to determine whether or not the objectives that we set ourselves have been satis-
factorily met. 
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1 Introduction and Research Dimensions 
1.1 New Technology Based Firms, High-Tech Start-Ups and  
Globalisation1 
In recent years, much of the debate of policy makers, business academics and practitioners alike has 
centred on the nature and implications of the increasing importance of trans- and multi-national, eco-
nomic activity.  Globalisation, the phenomenon of increasing economic interdependence across na-
tional borders, is believed to be particularly pertinent to high-technology industries.  These sectors are 
commonly characterised by high costs for research and development, decreasing product and technol-
ogy life cycles and strong competition from foreign firms (Oakey 1984, Porter 1986, Bartlett and 
Goshal 1989, Kobrin 1991).  Strategies that large multinationals have followed to react to the ‘forces’ 
of globalisation have included, for example, international expansion to achieve economies of scale and 
simultaneous product launches in several countries in order to maximise international returns in dy-
namic markets subject to fierce and immediate competitor responses.  International sales strategies 
have ranged from exporting and co-operative arrangements, such as joint ventures and licensing, to the 
more resource-intensive alternative of foreign direct investment. 
Each of these strategies requires additional managerial and financial resources.  This is because firms 
operating in foreign countries have to face a number of conditions that can put them at disadvantage to 
indigenous competitors.  These conditions, which impact negatively on their trading opportunities, in-
clude lack of information about the particular foreign business environment, different market regula-
tions that have to be taken into considerations, and the different social norms that influence how busi-
ness is conducted in culturally disparate countries.  The adaptation to these novel circumstances repre-
sents an economic and time cost that all firms - irrespectively of their size - have to bear when engag-
ing in cross-border activities.  Substantial efforts have been made in the last decade to harmonise the 
regulatory environments under which world trade is conducted.  This can be seen especially in the ac-
tions of the European Union to create a Single European Market or the creation of the North Atlantic 
Free Trade Association.  It is also observable at a global level through the increasing liberalisation of 
trade in goods, and more recently in services, through the multinational General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations.  None the less, despite 
these initiatives to harmonise markets, cross-border activities still represent an area of increased and 
significant risk and uncertainty – especially for small and young firms.  
Therefore, the question arises as to how can NTBFs, the smallest players in the high-technology sec-
tors, cope with these challenges?  Can these firms sustain resource-intensive entry modes in order to 
establish an international presence?  Conversely, do they have to place their bets on ‘second-best 
strategies’ aimed at surviving in the long term as domestic, niche producers?  Alternatively, have some 
NTBFs managed to find innovative ways of overcoming or better managing the costs and uncertainties 
traditionally associated with internationalisation?  Growth through international expansion might be a 
realistic option for some firms but not a viable commercial route for others.  What characteristics dis-
tinguish NTBFs with international activities from those NTBFs which choose to compete solely within 
a domestic setting?  What internal and external barriers have been encountered by internationalisers 
and non-internationalisers?  What impact does internationalisation have on firm performance? Does 
public policy have an effective role in increasing the export activities of international NTBFs or in en-
couraging those firms serving only domestic markets to start internationalising?  These specific and in-
ter-related issues represent the central themes and questions that this project sought to examine and re-
solve in both Germany and the UK.  
                                                 
1  Note that the two terms ‘new technology based firm’ (NTBF) and ‘high-tech start-up’ will be used inter-
changeably in this report. 
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1.2 The Importance of NTBFs 
Since the late 1970s, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) have been seen as an increasingly 
important policy vehicle for economic development goals within advanced Western economies.  This 
broadening of industrial policy to include SMEs as a complement to the historically predominant focus 
on larger, and thus more visible, firms was given a major impetus by Birch’s study at MIT (Birch 
1979).  Birch and his co-workers argued that two-thirds of new jobs in the USA over the period of 
1969-76 were a direct result of the expansive economic actions of small firms with under twenty 
workers.  Birch’s methodology, and especially the assumptions of his model, have engendered consid-
erable academic debate2. However, his central findings which illustrate the continuing and pivotal im-
portance of SMEs to a successful modern economy obtained widespread recognition and acceptance 
by policy makers both within and outside the USA.  
This governmental interest was not ideological in nature but was fuelled by an increasingly pragmatic 
recognition of both the actual, and potential future, contribution of SMEs to total employment and to 
the net creation of new jobs (Birch 1979, Gallagher and Stewart 1986, Storey, Watson and Wynarczyk 
1989).  In a European context, the European Union embraces approximately 17 million enterprises 
within its fifteen member states.  Revisions in thinking about the SME sector’s economic (and social) 
value included a new understanding of their centrality to the continued adaptation of European busi-
nesses in the novel competitive landscape of the ‘knowledge economy’ (Bettis and Hitt 1995, Euro-
pean Commission 1994 and 1995).  SMEs have now become one firmly established focus of the Euro-
pean Commission’s economic, technological and regional development policies as evidenced in their 
policy statement, The First Action Plan for Innovation in Europe: Innovation for Growth and Em-
ployment (EC 1997), and the subsequent 5th Framework Programme. 
The renewed attractiveness of SMEs was in part a consequence of the recognition that domestic indus-
trial policy, be it explicit or implicit, could not be left exclusively dependent on the fortunes of a rela-
tively small number of large, and increasingly globally organised, corporations.  Large firms in tradi-
tional industries or even national champions like, for example, Siemens in Germany, Rolls Royce in 
the United Kingdom and Fiat in Italy, could not meet fully the expectations of domestic governments 
and their electorates for sustainable high levels of employment in addition to growing real national in-
comes. Indeed, from the late 1960s, several internationally known and respected, large pan-European 
companies appeared increasingly vulnerable in industrial and consumer product markets now fre-
quently dominated by Asian or American suppliers. 
If revised expectations have been placed on the aggregate contributions of small and medium sized en-
terprises to a modern economy, the highest hopes have been reserved for New Technology Based 
Firms.  Within the wider corpus of small businesses, NTBFs continue to represent a peculiarly attrac-
tive focus for policy makers.  They are seen as offering significant potential benefits in four cardinal 
areas of policy interest: employment creation; innovation (including the effective dissemination and 
commercialisation of new ideas - particularly out of universities); export sales growth; and regional 
development (Rothwell and Zegveld 1982, Freeman 1983, OECD 1986 and 1997, Oakey, Rothwell 
and Cooper 1988, Rothwell 1989, Roberts 1991, Confederation of British Industry 1996, Coopers and 
Lybrand/NVCA 1996).  The 1988 Anglo-German Foundation report on NTBFs also lays stress on the 
potentially complementary relationship between NTBFs and large, science-based firms.  However, this 
report was candid in noting that many of the posited benefits are based on a longer American experi-
ence and remained, as yet, not fully demonstrated in Europe by the late 1980s.  
Just as Birch is credited with a major role in bringing the importance of SMEs to the fore within US 
public policy programmes, Americans are also seen as the primary progenitors of an élite cadre of 
large, trans-national, technology-based corporations.  These enormously successful and often rela-
tively young corporations owe, in significant part, the conditions of their existence to the US govern-
ment’s very material support for science-based and defence-related technological advances which have 
been discovered and/or developed since World War II.  International interest in the regional develop-
ment role of NTBFs has in part stemmed from an appreciation of their critical role from the early 
                                                 
2  Storey (1994a) concisely reviews the development and countervailing arguments of this debate. 
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1970s in the economic growth of concentrated areas of high technology activity in the USA, particu-
larly Silicon Valley, California and Route 128 around Boston, Massachusetts (Oakey 1984, Florida 
and Kenney 1988, Roberts 1991, Bygrave and Timmons 1992, Kenney and von Burg 1999). More re-
cently technology ‘clusters’ have also included Seattle, Houston and the North Carolina ‘triangle’.  Al-
though to a lesser degree, there is now also a growing body of evidence of NTBFs’ contribution to fast 
growth European regions (Meyer-Krahmer 1985, Keeble 1989 and Murray 1998). 
While job creation may be the ‘pay dirt’ of an economic policy, such an outcome has to be underwrit-
ten by one or more forms of sustainable economic advantage (Porter 1985).  The contribution of 
NTBFs to both net employment and firm formation has been shown by Storey and Tether (1998) to 
differ during the development and evolution of a technology sector with the rates of both job and firm 
formation both increasing and decreasing at different times.  However, regardless of the developmen-
tal stage of a sector, its ability to create jobs remains a function of its innovative capability.  The small 
size of NTBFs relative to their established competitors can convey significant structural advantages in 
both the creation and bringing to market of new innovative products and services.  This advantage 
may be articulated at the firm level (Rothwell and Zegveld 1982) and/or the industry level (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1990, Utterback and Suarez 1993).  However, the advantages of flexibility and closeness to 
market should not blind observers to the fact that NTBFs remain particularly vulnerable in their early 
years to a range of both endogenously and exogenously sourced risks (Westhead and Storey 1997, 
Murray and Marriott 1998).  Innovation, flexibility and a closeness to target markets cannot necessar-
ily protect NTBFs from large, established and aggressive market incumbents particularly when the 
competitive threat of the new entrant is fully appreciated. 
Recognition of the NTBFs’ advantages conveyed by small size (flexibility) and singleness of purpose 
(focus) has also resulted in NTBFs becoming attractive, and thus highly priced, acquisition targets for 
large, technology-based firms anxious to secure and exploit a stream of future innovations within their 
own core products and markets.  The recent growth in the number and value of early-stage funds man-
aged by technology-specialist venture capitalists in Europe (EVCA 1998), the growth in trade sales as 
the predominant exit for successful technology-based investee companies, and the renewed popularity 
of corporate venturing activities by established large firms (Block and McMillan 1993, McNally 1994, 
Gompers and Lerner 1998) are each indicative of the present attraction of NTBFs’ innovative capabili-
ties to larger firms. 
Policy makers in both Europe and America can compare and contrast the economic growth and sus-
tainability of cities such as Cambridge UK, Munich, Milan and Grenoble with their depressed, coun-
terpart regions in which the surviving remnants of Europe’s iron and steel, coal and other heavy indus-
tries are situated.  Par excellence, the techno-economic powerhouse of Southern California with its 
formidable network of established and new technology-based firms and the attendant concentration of 
support industries and services has become the contemporary exemplar for policy makers (Saxenian 
1994, Kenney and von Burg 1999).  Accordingly, the aspirations and expectations now placed on 
young technology based firms are extraordinary.  Few would herald the opening a small local grocer 
with expectations that it could become the Marks & Spencer or the Wal-Mart of the next decade.  Yet, 
there is, in a very real sense, an implicit but no less fervently considered, aspiration by the backers of 
an NTBF that it might just become the next Intel, Nokia, Cisco, SAP or Amgen.  The recent meteoric 
growth in 1998/99 stock market valuations of internet-based, ‘dot.com’ stocks including Yahoo, Ama-
zon, E-Bay and Broadcast (in the case of all but Yahoo, based entirely on future expected trading prof-
its) has done nothing to ground expectations in realism.  Even the more recent stock market correc-
tions in Spring 2000 have not completely curtailed the very high levels of investors’ expectations from 
technology stocks. 
However, while successful NTBFs potentially offer very material advantages to the economic prosper-
ity of a location, their genesis and early years are commonly fraught with extremely high levels of un-
certainty and risk.  This situation reigns in virtually all areas of NTBF activity including financing, 
technology and marketing (Oakey 1984, Roberts 1991, Murray 1994 and1995, Westhead and Storey 
1997, Murray and Marriott 1998, Storey 1998).  For the individual NTBF, an exceptional technologi-
cal offering is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic success.  Its entrepreneurial foun-
ders have also to manage organisational and product/market demands in both internal and external en-
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vironments characterised by their complexity and rapid rate of change.  In essence, the universe in 
which an NTBF typically operates is commonly defined by high levels of risk and uncertainty. 
Despite their putative attraction to a wide range of stake holders, NTBFs labour under very similar 
constraints to the majority of all SMEs.  Financing difficulties are particularly acute for NTBFs on 
formation and at their earliest stages of development (Roberts 1991, Moore 1994, Murray and Lott 
1995).  Limited tangible assets reduces their opportunity for collateral based lending from retail banks, 
which is the predominant source of external finance to European SMEs  (Storey 1994b). The eco-
nomic value of intellectual property rights created by the entrepreneur is, as yet, unproven and thus 
unexploitable (Rumelt 1984).  The ability of new entrepreneurs from a technology/scientific back-
ground to attract external equity finance, i.e. formal venture capital, is also prejudiced by their fre-
quent lack of commercial experience and the absence of an established track record of successful en-
terprise (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984, MacMillan, Siegal and Narishima 1985, Goslin and Barge 1986). In 
consequence, owner-managers of NTBFs are, per force, very heavily dependent on own and family 
personal finance for initial capitalisation (Oakey 1984, Roberts 1991, Moore 1994) in addition to rely-
ing on trade credit and, to a lesser extent, government grants (Utterback, Meyer, Roberts and Reitber-
ger 1988, Moore and Garnsey 1991).  
The imperfections of capital markets have featured largely in the debates on SME developmental con-
straints.  The proposition of the existence of an ‘equity gap’, i.e. a market failure in the adequate pro-
vision of small amounts of external risk capital for young and growing firms, has been part of the eco-
nomic literature for over 60 years (see The Macmillan Committee 1931).  A succession of official 
committees and research exercises since that date (e.g. Bolton 1971, Wilson 1979, Bannock 1991, 
Confederation of British Industry 1993, OECD 1995, Bank of England 1996) have each cited evidence 
of the existence of equity gaps and their deleterious effect on the viability of smaller businesses.  
These firms are generally characterised as having weaker liquidity, more volatile levels of profitabil-
ity, an over-dependence on short-term sources of finance and an insufficiency of shareholders’ funds 
or equity.  NTBFs are seen as particularly vulnerable to financial constraints given that initial invest-
ment costs, particularly R&D, are incurred before any prospect of consequent revenues.  In addition, 
the assets of the NTBF are intangible and, at least initially, unproven both technically and commer-
cially.  Even when proven, the real value of an NTBF often lies in the unique skills and experience of 
its staff.  This ‘tacit knowledge’ is unavailable to any creditors in the event of a loan default.  The pe-
culiarly intangible nature of key assets and sources of competitive advantage in knowledge-based 
firms, coupled with the frequent absence or limited availability of traditional collateral, makes the 
young NTBF’s use of debt based instruments often highly problematic. 
1.3 Theoretical Dimensions of Internationalisation 
Conceptual Frameworks 
Theoretical frameworks for the analysis of international business are well developed in managerial lit-
erature as well as in the economics literature (see Oviatt and McDougall 1994 for a review). Most 
prominent are internationalisation process models including stage models (Johanson and Vahlne 1977, 
Cavusgil 1980), monopolistic advantage theory (Hymer 1976), internalisation and transaction cost 
theory (Buckley and Casson 1976) as well as oligopolistic behaviour theories (Knickerbocker 1973). 
In addition, there are frameworks addressing a broader scope of issues such as such Dunning’s ideas 
put forward in various papers (e.g. Dunning 1980) which incorporates elements of monopolistic ad-
vantage, internalisation and international trade theories. More recent, the export management and the 
new trade theories also addresses the question of international business (see Leonidou and Katsikeas 
1996, Bernard and Jensen 1999). For the purpose of explaining international entrepreneurship, we be-
lieve that monopolistic advantage, transaction cost and internationalisation process models are the 
most relevant theoretical frameworks.  
The process model concentrates on the managerial aspects of internationalisation. Timing of market 
entry, the structural forms of foreign operations and their evolution over time are seen as functions of 
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the increasing experience and subsequently greater commitment of managers to foreign markets. Mo-
nopolistic advantage and internalisation theories, conversely, originally tried to explain why multina-
tional corporations exist as institutional forms for organising international production. These theories 
look at different aspects of internationalisation and try to answer different questions. So, the theories 
should not be view as contradictory frameworks but as models addressing complementary aspects and 
various dimensions of international entrepreneurship.  
Internationalisation process models see internationalisation as an incremental process of increasing 
commitment to foreign markets (Johanson and Vahlne 1977 and 1990). The mechanism behind this 
increasing involvement is seen as result of a circular learning process. A basic assumption is that firms 
have to deal with additional costs and uncertainties when entering a foreign environment. These are 
caused by, for example, material differences in the business culture, language, market structures etc. 
According to Johanson and Vahlne, firms overcome these disadvantages by gaining direct experiential 
knowledge of foreign markets over time. This knowledge, derived from the current international ac-
tivities, positively feeds back to the decision to commit resources for future activities and results in a 
steady increase of commitment to the foreign market. According to this view, a firm starts its interna-
tionalisation in markets with the lowest perceived uncertainty (or lowest psychic distance) using an en-
try mode that requires relatively few resources, such as exporting. Better and greater knowledge is ac-
quired over time through operating in that market.  Accordingly, uncertainties and information costs 
that were present prior to the initial investment decrease. Based on the new knowledge, the firm reas-
sesses its position and may increase its involvement in the foreign environment. The initial involve-
ment reduces uncertainty which then may leads to an increasing commitment and a scaling up of the 
foreign operations towards more resource-intensive modes. Furthermore, the knowledge acquired dur-
ing the first foreign market entry influences the choice and entry mode for subsequent markets.  
Johanson and Vahlne’s work provided the basis for extensive empirical research from numerous 
scholars in different countries. Known under the heading “stage models” of internationalisation, they 
support the view of internationalisation as an incremental process (Bilkey and Tesar 1977, Bilkey 
1978,, Cavusgil 1980, Reid 1981, Wortzel and Wortzel 1981, Czinkota 1982, Barrett and Wilkinson 
1985, Moon and Lee 1990, Lim, Sharkey and Kim 1991, Rao and Naidu 1992, Crick 1995). All of 
these studies argue that internationalisation behaviour is best represented by invoking distinct stages in 
a firm’s life which start from no foreign involvement and increase to the final state of foreign direct 
investment. The methodological foundations of empirical studies using this concept have frequently 
been subject to strong criticism (Turnbull 1987, see also Andersen 1993; Leonidou and Katsikeas 
1996 for reviews). Critics point out that stage models are tautological. Instead of reflecting increasing 
commitment to internationalisation, the different stages are direct results of the classification criteria 
used by the researchers. Their arbitrary definition makes it difficult to delimit the stages. In addition, 
all studies have been derived from cross-sectional samples which makes it impossible to analyse the 
temporal and causal logic behind the internationalisation process. While it is accepted that internation-
alisation may not proceed in distinct and predetermined stages, the basic logic behind the internation-
alisation process developed by Johanson and Vahlne is arguably still a powerful model of the dynam-
ics within the internationalising firm (Melin 1992).  
In internalisation theory, the decision to internationalise is taken as given. According to this perspec-
tive, firms build up facilities abroad when the costs associated with arms-length transactions in the 
market place, for example exporting, are higher than the costs associated with internal transactions 
(Buckley and Casson 1976, Hennart 1989). In this case, the international growth of a company is 
achieved through the displacement of cross-border markets, which operate in a less efficient way than 
cross-border hierarchies. Internalisation theory is thus primarily an attempt to explain foreign direct 
investment as an operating mode of international business.  
The theoretical core of internalisation theory, transaction cost economics (TCE), explicitly aims to 
compare the efficiency of particular governance modes (Williamson 1985). Its main application to the 
field of international business is concerned with the choice of the optimal market entry modes and not 
with the decision to compete abroad per se. In essence, TCE makes the behavioural assumptions of 
bounded rationality and self interest which may lead actors to behave opportunistically. Safeguarding 
against these risks when dealing with a partner as opposed to carrying out the transaction within a hi-
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erarchy gives rise to transaction costs (Williamson 1985). Situations where bounded rationality and 
self interest are particularly problematic arise in the presence of asset specificity or uncertainty result-
ing from information asymmetries (Williamson 1985, Anderson & Gatignon 1986). Asset specificity 
occurs when one party to the transaction has to invest in co-specialised assets to make the relationship 
work (Teece 1986). This party can subsequently be taken hostage by the other contracting party due to 
the sunk costs involved in the arrangement. Contracts can be devised to minimise the risk of shirking 
by one of the parties. Yet, it is unrealistic to attempt to specify a situation entirely. Furthermore, the 
costs of devising such contracts as well as monitoring and enforcing them may be prohibitive for both 
parties. Asset specificity, uncertainty and information asymmetries between buyer and seller are par-
ticularly pertinent in high-technology industries. TCE theorists argue that, in the presence of these 
conditions, it is more efficient to carry out economic activity within a hierarchy rather than to deal 
with a partner. Since the firm’s advantage over markets lie in its ability to set incentives, monitor pro-
gress, settle disputes and refine rewards (Mahoney 1992), firms that face these conditions are expected 
to carry out international activities without involving intermediaries (i.e. direct exporting or direct in-
vestment in sales subsidiaries). Note that this implication is in stark contrast with the internationalisa-
tion process logic which sees first-hand experiential knowledge as a determinant of the entry mode 
choice. The theory suggest that there may be situations, where very innovative start-up companies op-
erating at the forefront of technological developments can only appropriate rents for their activities 
through internalised transactions. Furthermore, transaction frequency and the pre- and after-sales ser-
vice requirements may require local presence instead of arms-length exporting. Yet, the average start-
up will rarely have the financial resources to set up a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. As a result, we 
end up with a dilemma where, on the one hand, TCE and internalisation theories may recommend un-
der certain conditions that the start-up internalises a transaction in order to minimise the risk of market 
failures typically associated with high-tech environments. On the other, the average start-up lacks the 
substantial resources required to effect practicably this theoretical prescription.  
Monopolistic advantage theory and resource-based approaches (RBV) might represent a useful 
platform to reconcile process models and transaction theory. Monopolistic advantage theory holds that 
a firm can generate higher rents from the utilisation of firm specific assets which cannot be replicated 
by other firms (Hymer 1976). The rents that stem from this quasi-monopoly can then be used to offset 
the higher costs of competing abroad. Monopolistic advantage can be view as a predecessor of the re-
source-based view of the firm (e.g. Wernerfelt 1984, Peteraf 1993) and more recent approaches that 
see organisational capabilities (OC) as important determinants of organisational outcomes (e.g. Kogut 
and Zander 1996, Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). Based on Penrose’s notion of the firm as a bundle 
of assets, the resource-based view of the firm argues that organisational performance is a function of 
the internal assets of a firm. If these resources are matched appropriately to the external environment, 
then the firm may command a competitive advantage over its rivals. Resources include both physical 
resources and intangible resources. While the former can be more easily obtained and imitated, it is 
especially the latter that differentiate a firm from its rivals. They include management skills, brand 
names, unique processes, organisational culture and the tacit knowledge of employees. It is this idio-
syncratic bundle of intangible resources that will determine how the physical resources will be de-
ployed and thus lead to firm-specific returns.  
International activities would then be determined by the resources and capabilities that a firm pos-
sesses and that allow it to overcome the initial costs of competing in foreign environments. This would 
apply in the case of a young, highly specialised company offering an innovative solution that no com-
petitor can match. This solution might stem from a product or process innovation, it might be an inno-
vative product or service or even an organisational ability (such as a particular competitive behaviour, 
i.e. selling goods over the internet thus saving distribution time and cost). At a given moment in time, 
when no competitor can provide a solution that is of equal value for the customer or at similar price, it 
becomes possible to envisage a small start-up company leveraging this solution into foreign markets 
despite its higher costs relative to domestic operations. The costs of internationalisation can thus be 
offset either by above-average returns due to the inability of rivals to provide an equal solution.  
One can conclude that different theories lead to conflicting prescriptions when the firms in question 
are simultaneously young and operating in high-technology industries. On the one hand, according to 
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internationalisation process theory and stage models, small start-ups are hardly expected to engage in 
international activities. Exceptionally, if they do so, they are expected to chose entry modes which re-
quire few resources. Conversely, internalisation theory takes the decision to internationalise as given 
and expects that firms operating in high-tech industries would, under certain conditions, choose quite 
resource intensive entry modes. A resource-based perspective could provide a bridge between these 
two arguments and link the decision to internationalise and the chosen entry modes to the resource en-
dowments of the firm. An empirical comparison between the characteristics and behaviour of interna-
tionalisers and non internationalisers could therefore help uncover which of these perspectives con-
tribute most to the internationalisation decision.  
Empirical Studies in International Entrepreneurship 
Despite the established status of internationalisation as a field of study, surprisingly little research has 
been conducted into the detailed processes by which young and high-technology companies have in-
ternationalised.  Observations that these firms engage in cross-border activities from a very early stage 
of their existence represent an interesting challenge for the established body of theory in the area of in-
ternational business.  Research activity in this field has historically been strongly oriented towards 
large firms or ‘traditional’ smaller firms.  When the firms under scrutiny are at the same time young 
and high-tech, established theories warrant conflicting prescriptions.  Behavioural theories (Johanson 
and Vahlne 1977 and 1990) argue that internationalisation is a slow and incremental process whereas 
economic theories (Buckley and Casson 1976, Cantwell 1991) do not rule out rapid and resource-
intensive internationalisation.  Thus, when it comes to the internationalisation of NTBFs, it is possible 
- depending on the theoretical perspective that is chosen - to explain why some start-ups engage in 
cross-border activities whereas others stay domestic. However, these theoretical rationalisations can 
only be employed ex-post. They have no predictive power to determine which firms are likely to inter-
nationalise or stay domestic. Explanations without predictive power have little value to either academ-
ics or practitioners. 
Our unsatisfactory understanding of internationalisation processes, and particularly as they relate to 
the actions of NTBFs, is worrying.  There is a compelling case for further research embracing both 
theoretical and pragmatic goals.  As previous academic enquiries into this area have primarily been 
exploratory in nature (see MacDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994, Murray 1996, Boter and Holmquist 
1996), the present authors proposed a systematic investigation of the determinants of cross-border ac-
tivities of start-up and young companies in high-technology sectors.  In the most thorough study on 
this topic known to the researchers (Lindqvist 1991), variables that have previously been seen to corre-
late with the internationalisation of traditional small firms, such as technology intensity, firm size and 
ownership structure were found not to contribute to explanations of the international activities of small 
high-tech firms.  Even though the firms included in the sample exhibited a relatively heterogeneous in-
ternationalisation pattern. Lindqvist failed to show any significant correlations between these variables 
and the chosen performance indicators.   
Therefore, the scant empirical evidence in this area suggests that our understanding remains incom-
plete and often rudimentary.  Particularly, there is a dearth of large scale, survey based studies with a 
specific focus on NTBFs.  Furthermore, on the theoretical side, one can observe the conflicting pre-
scriptions of behavioural and economic theories which are founded on observations of either large or 
small traditional firms.  Accordingly, the Anglo-German research team proposed a detailed investiga-
tion into the determinants of cross-border activities of NTBFs.  The study was to be specifically de-
signed to address the actions and beliefs of the management of NTBFs.  Of critical importance was the 
early decision of the researchers that the study would include data from both internationalising and 
non-internationalising new technology-based small firms.  This ‘matched sample’ methodology was 
expected to contribute to a better understanding of the applicability of growth and internationalisation 
theories to this sub-set of firms. 
The two tables below provide a synopsis of the contemporary research work in the area of interna-
tional entrepreneurship. Evidently, there is a dearth of large scale, survey studies which have focused 
on the processes of internationalisation as they specifically affect new technology based firms. 
  
 
 
 
Table  
Overview of Quantitative Research (Surveys) in International Entrepreneurship 
Authors McDougall Lindqvist Bell McDougall & Oviatt Bloodgood, Almeida & 
Sapienza 
Reuber & Fischer 
       
Year published 1989 1991 1995 1996 1996 1997 
Number of surveyed 
firms 
188 95 98 62 61 49 
Industry IT/Comm. Hardware Various High-Tech Software IT/Comm. Hardware Various Services and 
High-Tech 
Software 
Mean firm age n.a. 12 n.a. 4 < 5 years  11 
Mean firm size n.a. 56 n.a. 22.6 1668 41 
Explicit focus on in-
ternational new ven-
tures 
yes no no yes yes (?) no 
Key findings domestic and inter-
national ventures differ 
in terms of industry and 
strategy profile, notion 
that INVs are different 
observed rapid interna-
tionalisation, but mar-
ket selection and entry 
modes in line with in-
ternationalisation proc-
ess theory 
stage models cannot 
account for foreign 
market selection and 
entry mode 
international new ven-
tures have higher levels 
of market share, but not 
ROI, Increased interna-
tional sales only lead to 
increased performance 
when accompanied by 
strategic change 
international work ex-
perience of managers, 
product differentiation 
and firm size are posi-
tively relative to inter-
nationalisation, level of 
internationalisation at 
IPO is positively re-
lated to earnings 2 
years later 
international expe-
rience of management, 
mediator effect of in-
ternationalisation be-
haviour which in turn 
positively influences 
the firm's degree of in-
ternationalisation  
(Based on Bürgel 1999) 
  
Table:  
Overview of Qualitative Research (Case Studies) in International Entrepreneurship 
Authors Lindqvist Jolly, Alahuhta 
and Jeannet 
McDougall, Shane 
and Oviatt 
Bell Coviello & Munro Boter & Holm-
quist 
Murray Roberts & Sen-
turia 
Year published 1991 1992 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 1996 
Number of Cases/ 
Interviews 
15 4 24 (12 indirectly 
from secondary 
sources) 
24 4 6 6 19 
Industry Various High-
Tech 
IT/Com. hardware Various industries, 
mainly technology 
intensive 
Software Software “innovative”, 
“conventional” 
Various High-
Tech 
IT hardware and 
software 
Firm Age 6-25 years <= 8 years n.a. n.a. 10-15 10-15 * 4-10 n.a. 
Firm Size 7-135 employees n.a. n.a. n.a. 25-250 8-180 12-155 n.a. 
Explicit Focus on 
international new 
ventures 
No yes yes No yes no no no 
Key findings Evidence of rapid 
internationalisa-
tion with strong 
resource, but 
stronger commit-
ment form larger 
and older firms 
Reports the case of 
four small start-
ups that became 
global players, 
they now perform 
different activities 
of their value 
chain in different 
countries 
Established theo-
ries of interna-
tional business fail 
to explain the for-
mation of interna-
tional new ven-
tures 
Stage models can-
not account for 
foreign market se-
lection and entry 
mode 
“Random” in-
volvement in for-
eign markets can 
be attributed to 
network of con-
tacts.  
internationalisa-
tion should be un-
derstood in indus-
try context, all in-
novative compa-
nies were more 
pro-active interna-
tionalisers 
international expe-
rience of founder, 
international and 
industry experi-
ence of key man-
agers 
More rapid and 
bolder resource 
commitment than 
expected by inter-
national business 
theories, but: in-
cremental pattern 
Other findings strongest commit-
ment in firms with 
executives with in-
ternational and in-
dustry experience  
international vi-
sion, standardised 
products, innova-
tive products 
based on industry 
shift, speed, fol-
low-up products 
background of the 
entrepreneur, his 
international vi-
sion and network 
are important de-
terminants 
product standardi-
sation 
Heavy reliance on 
network relation-
ships for market-
ing related activi-
ties 
concentrated 
product scope, 
background of 
managers 
deliberate target-
ing of large and 
growing US mar-
ket, international 
competition, com-
placency of in-
cumbent large 
firms 
standardisation, 
founders’ interna-
tional experience, 
higher commit-
ment leads to 
higher foreign 
sales, replication 
of domestic busi-
ness model 
*innovative firms only, (Based on Bürgel 1999) 
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1.4 Policy Dimensions 
Research studies both in the US and Europe have concluded that new technology-based firms are a 
source of important innovations and high-quality employment, in addition to highlighting their contri-
bution to regional and structural adjustment (see for example Rothwell and Zegveld 1982, Piore and 
Sabel 1984, Kulicke 1987, Garnsey and Cannon-Brookes 1993, Westhead and Storey 1994).  Yet, re-
searchers and practitioners alike have repeatedly observed that the hugely impressive success-stories 
of US firms like Cisco, Oracle, Compaq, Intel and Microsoft, which rapidly3 grew from start-ups to 
become dominant industry players, have very few parallel among European firms.  When performance 
is measured in the aggregate numbers of firms and jobs created, Europe continues to lag behind the US 
(Coopers and Lybrand 1996, Storey and Tether 1998).  Cultural differences, legal constraints, fiscal 
regimes unconducive to entrepreneurial activity, the limited availability of early-stage risk capital, and 
an insufficient infrastructure of second-tier financial markets are each frequently cited as instrumental 
reasons for this failure (Anglo-German Foundation 1988, Murray and Lott 1995, European Commis-
sion 1995, Storey and Tether 1998, DTI 1998 and Williams 1998.) 
Some of these issues are currently being addressed by policy makers.  European based stock markets 
specialising in trading in innovative young companies, including the Alternative Investment Market 
and the TechMARK4 in the UK, the Nouveau Marché in France, the Neuer Markt in Germany and 
EASDAQ, have all been established in the last decade in order to assist rapidly growing firms in ac-
cessing public sources of finance.  These moves reflect the admiration evinced in Europe for the semi-
nal performance of the NASDAQ market in the US in attracting and financing large numbers of high 
quality NTBFs (Graham Bannock and Partners Ltd. 1994).  In addition, the First Action Plan for Inno-
vation in Europe launched in 1997 by the European Commission (EC 1997) has the stated goal of 
simplifying and harmonising the administrative environment for high-technology start-ups in its mem-
ber states.   
Finally, European venture capital markets have seen an influx of new finance from overseas investors 
which implicitly assumes that European NTBFs are under-priced.5.  Yet, investment executives from 
domestic venture capital funds simultaneously claim that European countries lack sufficient high qual-
ity entrepreneurs who can combine both technological and managerial expertise to create exciting new 
companies.  In their view, it is not a supply-side failure in the market for venture or risk capital but a 
demand-side problem.  Accordingly, venture capitalists argue that future policy initiatives should be 
geared towards increasing the supply of experienced and professional ‘investment ready’ entrepre-
neurs in which they can confidently invest (DIST 1997, Storey and Tether 1998).  In the present au-
thors’ view, there are merits to the arguments for both supply and demand side failure.  Until the sec-
ond half of the present decade, the European venture capital industry could have been said to have 
largely abandoned technology investments, particularly at the earliest stage of seed or start-up invest-
ing6.  Similarly, too many of the applicants for venture capitalists’ money are insufficiently well pre-
pared to reasonably expect professional investors’ support. 
                                                 
3  The term ‘rapidly’ needs clarifying in the light of contemporary experience with e-commerce related busi-
nesses.  Bhidé (2000) notes that  some of the most successful firms in US history, including Microsoft and 
Hewlett Packard, had significant gestation periods and were not overnight successes. Given the extremely 
variable commercial performance of e-commerce enterprises to date, extreme caution is necessary in making 
any assumptions regarding the changing rate of firm success. 
4  Started operating in the UK in November 1999. 
5  Since 1998, a number of very large venture capital funds (>€1 billion) being set up in Europe by US venture 
capitalists to target both early and later stage deals on a trans-continental basis. 
6  By general consensus among venture capitalists, the provision of sums of finance below £1,000,000 is in-
creasingly difficult for a fully commercial fund. 
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Research on the characteristics of successful high-tech entrepreneurs7 originates mainly in the United 
States and has been characterised until recently by a remarkable absence of European scholarship 
(Shane 1997).  While we do not argue that American prescriptions are not applicable in a European 
context, we would, nonetheless, like to highlight a very particular issue.  Given the size of the US 
market, it is possible for a new American enterprise to sustain high growth rates over several years en-
tirely through domestic operations.  In a European context, characterised by the smaller size of na-
tional markets, a producer of highly specialised, advanced technology products or services may 
achieve comparable growth in the longer term only through international expansion.  However, in or-
der to engage in cross-border activities, a European entrepreneur may require additional skills other 
than those assumed in the US research literature.  The basic requirements of exceptional technological 
expertise and sufficient commercial acumen to start and grow a new business are necessary but not 
sufficient.  In addition, the European technology entrepreneur must cultivate the ability to be under-
stood and accepted in order to operate effectively in a range of disparate, national cultural, legal and 
commercial environments.   
Thus, ‘soft’ trans-national, social or networking skills may be a further demanding precondition for the 
entrepreneurial managers of European NTBFs if they wish to achieve economic successes comparable 
to those of their American counterparts.  Rigorous empirical research in this area, which encapsulates 
and interprets the experiences of NTBF internationalisers, may have two valuable roles.  Research 
findings can be disseminated directly to NTBF managers who are already international, or who would 
like to internationalise their activities.  Secondly, any identified factors which either promote or inhibit 
overseas activity can be used to inform public policy initiatives aimed at improving the quality and 
supply of European entrepreneurs.  
1.5 Managerial and Operational Dimensions 
Insufficiently diversified start-ups which base their business on one or a small number of products or 
services are characterised by a high exposure to risk.  Niche producers always run the risk that they 
have chosen a market focus that turns out to be irrelevant or quickly superseded.  Further, given the 
rapidity with which concatenated technology trajectories merge, the superior economic rents gained by 
an innovative NTBF from a temporarily dominant market position can be, and very often are, quickly 
eroded.  The entry of one or more competitors with a cheaper offering and/or products providing 
greater functionality but at a comparable price, or the ultimate substitution of the NTBF’s products 
with alternatives based on a superior technology8 (Roberts 1991) can each rapidly precipitate the fail-
ure of the incumbent firm.  Thus, to even have the chance of achieving long-term viability in fast 
changing technological environments, a start-up needs to have substantial initial finance.  In the ab-
sence of sufficient start-up finance, the firm must be able to generate rapidly significant additional fol-
low-on funding in order to finance the development of further applications of their base technology.  
In addition, the young and growing firms also face the short-term necessity of recovering the initial 
costs of development, prototyping and commercialisation of their products.  These finances may have 
been generated internally or externally.  In the former case, if the venture is not in a position to sustain 
a premium price strategy to collect above-average (quasi-monopoly) rents over a long period of time, 
this objective can only be met through rapid sales expansion.  However, this strategy is almost in-
variably cash consuming in the short term.  In the latter case, a possible source of external funding 
could be a third-party investor, such as a venture capitalist or business angel Again, growth is likely to 
remain an imperative for the externally financed start-up as early-stage venture capitalists set ambi-
tious growth objectives for their investee firms in order to maximise valuations and capital gain.  Ven-
                                                 
7 Note that the term ‘entrepreneur’ will be used to refer both to an individual founder/manager or a found-
ing/management team of a start-up. 
8  As the ‘dominant design’ literature shows (Anderson and Tushman 1990), superiority does not necessarily 
means technologically more advanced as successes in the PC operating system and VCR tape markets bear 
witness. 
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ture capitalists also live in competitive markets.  They must demonstrate attractive portfolio returns to 
their institutional investors if they wish to ensure the success of future fund raising exercises  
Assuming growth is an imperative and that, in a European context, this growth may more efficiently 
be achieved through international expansion, what factors other than the entrepreneur’s ability to oper-
ate in different cultural environments facilitate or hinder the establishment of cross-border activities?  
Is there an identifiable link between the strategic orientation of a new venture (for example, its pricing 
strategies), its choice of distribution channels or the specific characteristics of its products, and the 
firms’ consequent success in establishing cross-border sales?  Research studies have examined the re-
lationship between the profitability of a start-up and various strategy variables (for example Feeser and 
Willard 1990, Picot, Laub and Schneider 1990, Carter, Stearns and Miller 1994).  However, only one 
study (undertaken in the US) is known to the research team which tried to link strategy and product 
variables directly to internationalisation performance (McDougall 1989).  It is illuminating, given 
European arguments of insufficient domestic market size, that this US study defined ‘international’ 
start-ups as firms with a minimum of 5% of their sales coming from cross-border operations.  It is, 
therefore, debatable whether the findings of this study are widely applicable outside the US.  This is 
particularly so as internationalisation did not feature as an area of primary strategic concern for the 
majority of the US companies which McDougall surveyed.  
McDougall’s American findings are in apparently stark contrast with the findings of a number of 
European researchers who have shown that it was not unusual for the NTBFs in their samples to have 
the majority of their revenues coming from abroad (Bell 1995, Nichols and Nyvold 1995, Jolly et al. 
1992).  However, because of the exploratory focus of these case study investigations (Yin 1994), their 
primary importance is in highlighting the very different market situations facing US and European 
NTBFs.  In order to corroborate trans-Atlantic differences, further systematic research into the links 
between strategy variables and internationalisation performance would necessarily require substantial 
survey activity and the authority of statistical verification.  The research team believed that, given 
these valuable ‘straws in the wind’ provided by the cited case study research, there was a strong case 
to be made for the execution of a major survey looking specifically at the contemporary internationali-
sation behaviour of NTBFs in Europe. 
1.6 The Comparative Dimension: Germany versus the United King-
dom 
An Anglo-German comparison has relevance and value because it can help shed light on three impor-
tant issues.  First, in the debates of international competitiveness, Germany is usually referred to as an 
example of a highly regulated country.  Conversely, the UK is seen as a more deregulated economy in 
which the primacy of market forces is viewed as more important.  A highly regulated environment is 
believed to be one consequence of a culture which is characterised by strong uncertainty avoidance 
(Hofsteede 1980, 1991).  Given the central role of uncertainty in behavioural theories of international 
business, German firms - irrespectively of their size and their sector of activities – should inter alia be 
generally less outward oriented than British start-ups. Second, the direction of outward trade flows of 
these two countries differs markedly.  British companies have traditionally had closer economic (and 
cultural) ties to North America and to members of the British Commonwealth.  While fellow members 
of the European Union are cumulatively the largest trading partner of the UK, the US continues to re-
main the critically most important market for British firms.  Conversely, the majority of German ex-
ports are traditionally oriented towards its neighbouring countries in continental Europe with France 
being the largest single market worldwide (IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1998).   
The US was perceived by many NTBF respondents as the single most important market for high-tech 
products.  America arguably boasts the most sophisticated customers for high-technology products and 
services.  This is of importance for NTBFs as many new product innovations are frequently triggered 
through close co-operation with lead customers.  It therefore becomes of interest to find out whether 
the internationalisation activities of British and German NTBFs do reflect the traditional direction and 
patterns of these two countries’ aggregate trade flows.  Conversely, given the peculiarly super-national 
characteristics of technology products and their users, is there a convergence in UK and German new 
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technology trade flows?  If the latter is true, it would reflect the greater strategic importance attributed 
by NTBFs to key contemporary markets for technology rather than to historic trading patterns and tra-
ditional partners.  
There is a third issue that is of relevance for an Anglo-German comparison.  The UK hosts the most 
vibrant NTBF sector in Europe (Storey and Tether 1998) with arguably the best provision of market 
mediated, finance and other support mechanisms (Murray 1995).  Other scholars have argued that the 
way firms and markets operate is strongly influenced by the national institutional context (see Lane 
1992 for an explicitly Anglo-German comparison).  It has to be acknowledged that a detailed analysis 
of how the two different contexts shape the international activities of NTBFs is beyond the scope of 
the proposed project.  Nonetheless, the debate on national business systems (Whitley 1992) and na-
tional innovation systems (Nelson 1992, Lundvall 1992, Legler, Licht and Spielkamp 1999) would 
benefit from research comparing the outward orientation of British and German NTBFs. 
In summary, one would expect that British NTBFs are more outward oriented than their German coun-
terparts.  However, the example of traditional German SMEs, the “Mittelstand”, shows that a large 
proportion of these firms is very actively involved in cross-border activities.  The situation is more 
complex that simple, national characterisations might suggest.  Therefore, an investigation which in-
cludes these issues could examine the question whether or not these firms behave according to na-
tional stereotypes.  Conversely, it might be argued that there exists now an occupational ‘high-tech’ 
culture which transcends national borders.  The latter hypothesis has been suggested by at least two 
recent exploratory studies which reported that the internationalisation processes of several NTBFs 
originating from different countries were very similar both in terms of structural aspects and ‘triggers’ 
(Boter and Holmquist 1996, Oviatt and McDougall 1994).  As only one German and one British firm 
were included in one of these two studies, neither study adequately addresses our agenda.  It therefore 
remains valuable to investigate on a larger scale whether one can observe more similarities than dif-
ferences - and in what specific activities or functions - in the internationalisation behaviour of start-ups 
operating in these two distinctly different European business cultures 
Overview 
The following summary of our research findings are reported in three main chapters. We opted for a 
two-stage research process based on the methodologies employed. Econometric models were initially 
constructed to determine the key variables influencing each particular area of firm behaviour.  In addi-
tion, the nature of the similarity or the difference between German and UK companies was noted on 
those occasions where the differences were statistically significant and deemed material.  The findings 
of the quantitative analyses were also interpreted and referenced in the light of a parallel series of 40 
case studies undertaken on a sub-sample of German and UK respondents from the postal survey.  
Again, a matched sample approach was adopted in order to highlight possibly important differences at 
the levels of the firm, market or product between internationalising and non-internationalising firms.  
The combination of the two research methodologies allowed the power of the statistical analyses to be 
directly complemented by the richness of detail and insight obtained from personal interview and dis-
cussion.  The dialogues with selected firm founders, on which the case studies were based, were par-
ticularly useful in assisting both the interpretation of quantitative data and the discussions of policy 
implications stemming from our findings. 
In this summary report we omit as far as possible the discussion of methodological details e.g. with 
regard to specific reasons for the exact definitions of variables or the detailed specification of regres-
sion models. In order to keep this summary report a manageable length, we also avoid lengthy discus-
sions of the relation of our results to the existing literature or why we choose a certain type of econo-
metric model. Further, we omit a case by case discussion of our 40 matched pair, case studies. How-
ever, a more detailed description of our research methods and findings is available in the full version 
of our report9. 
                                                 
9  In addition to this AGF Summary Report, it is the intention of the authors to produce a published volume of 
the full research report in 2001.  Readers wishing for more information in the interim can approach Drs. Licht 
or Murray at ZEW or London Business School, respectively. 
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Chapter 2 which presents our findings using a quantitative methodology is organised as follows:  
 We first summarise in section 2.1 the process of data collection from the mail survey and give 
some brief observations on methodological aspects of the data collection process. This section 
gives details on the origin of our samples and some indication as to how we weight our data in or-
der to arrive at meaningful descriptive statistics for NTBFs in both countries. 
 Based on the mail survey data, section 2.2 provides an overview of the importance of international 
business for young, high-tech companies. Descriptive statistics presented in this section convinc-
ingly demonstrates that international business is the rule for NTBFs and not the exception. 
 Section 2.3 presents descriptive details on UK and German NTBFs. This section enables a com-
parative UK-German perspective on characteristics of NTBFs and so allows comparisons between 
our study and other empirical studies of NTBFs. We provide information on firm-specific (e.g. 
age, industry, size) and founder-specific characteristics (e.g. international experience, team size) 
and describe the firms in terms of the degree of customisation and the technologies adopted in 
their main product. Some descriptive results on motives and costs of international business activi-
ties are also provided. 
 The theoretical framework which guides our empirical analyses is summarised in section 2.4. Here 
we discuss briefly the main theoretical perspectives on the internationalisation of new technology 
based firms. We highlight the empirical implications of various theoretical approaches and discuss 
their empirical implementation within a multivariate regression framework.  
 Section 2.5 looks more closely at the differences between start-ups with and without international 
activities. We test the applicability and discriminatory power of various propositions derived from 
our theoretical framework. Thus, we attempt to explain why some start-ups engage in cross-border 
activities from an early stage of their existence whereas others only serve their home markets.  
 Section 2.6 introduces the empirical results with regard to the determinants of the degree of inter-
nationalisation of the sampled firms. This section addresses the question whether internationalisa-
tion could be interpreted as a non-linear phenomenon, i.e. the actions of internationalising firms 
can best be understood and modelled as “overcoming a barrier” or “jumping a threshold”.  
 Section 2.7 investigates issues related to the timing of internationalisation. The unexpected, early 
or accelerated foreign market entry and subsequent evolution of international activities is arguably 
one of the defining features of internationally operating start-up firms.  
 Section 2.8 summaries our results regarding the entry decisions of NTBFs. It describes the geo-
graphical and structural aspects of the market entries of the sampled firms and also investigates the 
determinants of the chosen entry modes.  
 The impact of internationalisation on the performance of NTBFs is evaluated in section 2.9. First, 
we compare the productivity (sales per employees) of internationalisers and non internationalisers. 
Second, we look at the determinants of sales and employment growth and test for significant dif-
ferences between firms with and without international sales. 
Chapter 3 presents the results based on the matched pair case studies. It is divided into six sections 
and covers the following aspects:  
 Section 3.1 briefly describes the matching criteria used for both the UK and German cases.   The 
data collection process is detailed. The different steps in summarising and analysing the match 
pairs studies are introduced and described in order to make the process of information retrieval 
from oral interviews transparent.  
 Section 3.2 sheds some more light on the timing of internationalisation by analysing the case study 
results. Especially, we discuss the role of MNCs for the internationalisation process of NTBFs. 
 Similarly, section 3.3 categorises the typical features of fast growing firms and slow growing 
firms. Our case studies confirm the crucial role technological advantages have for fast growing 
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German firms.  In contrast, fast growing firms in the UK more strongly stress the importance of 
managerial experience or market strategies as the key drivers of growth. 
 The role of venture capitalists, as a professional source of finance and advice, for the development 
of NTBFs is discussed in section 3.4. We discuss the complex relationship between entrepreneurs 
and their their professional investors and – based on case study evidence – demonstrate the multi-
faceted nature of venture capital investment.  
 We also talked to the entrepreneurs about the role public support measures have in the process of 
firm formation and firm growth. Their views are reported and appraised in section 3.5. 
 Finally, in section 3.6 we seek to establish some robust differences between British and German 
NTBF. However, it transpires that, as evidenced from the case studies, NTBFs in Germany and 
Britain share a great deal in common, for example facing similar problems and develop similar 
strategies to deal with these problems. Where differences do occur, they are frequently a result of 
the differing education systems and variations in the existing industry structure. 
Chapter 4 provides an overall summary of our work and highlights the key conclusions of the study.  
These conclusions are first used to develop a list of ‘strategic lessons’ for entrepreneurs and managers 
of NTBFs (Section 4.1). Conclusions and implications for innovation and technological policy are 
contained in section 4.2. In section 4.3 we discuss existing theories of international entrepreneurship 
and give a summary evaluation of their empirical relevance from the perspective of our own findings. 
Finally, we suggest some future research directions for the important subject of international entrepre-
neurship  
Appendices  are also included (A to D) which provide additional information for the more technically 
interested reader detailing aspects of the research methodology used to conduct the study. Appendix D 
also contain descriptions of the full regression models from which the results discussed in this report 
are derived.  
.
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2 Research Findings from the Quantitative Methodologies 
2.1 The New Technology Based Firm Mail Survey 
Data for quantitative part of our study was generated through a mail survey using a four page ques-
tionnaire which was virtually identical for both countries. A copy of the questionnaire is given in the 
Appendix B. The questionnaire included variables to measure ‘transaction costs’ during the sales pro-
cess and proxies for situation in which high transaction costs are expected to occur. In addition, infor-
mation on the commercial and international experience of founders was requested. We also asked re-
spondents several specific questions about the characteristics of their firm, including details of the 
traded products and services as well as the resources devoted to R&D. Finally, the respondents were 
asked to rank different motivations for international activities, and to determine the scale of costs and 
constraints which they had experienced during this process.  
For the purpose of this study, a high-tech start-up is defined as being a legally independent company 
which is no older than ten years since formation and which operates in one or more high-technology 
sectors. We use the list of high-technology sectors established by Butchart (1987) to determine the 
relevant sectors in manufacturing. In addition, we include start-ups from selected service industries 
which where found to be R&D intensive in a recent study for Germany (Licht et al., 1997). One major 
drawback of our study is that we neglect high-start ups in low-tech industries. Yet, as opposed to tar-
geting low-technology sectors in the search for high-technology start-ups, the adopted  approach re-
sulted in an increased likelihood of obtaining responses from firms that fulfil the specified sampling 
criteria for our mail survey. Details on the specific industries included in the survey are also given in 
Appendix 1. 
We use sampling frames resulting from similar data sources in both countries. Sampling was based on 
firms operating in the defined, high tech industries, which had at least three employees in 1997, and 
that had been founded between 1987 and 1996. To identify those firms we used Dun & Bradstreet in 
the UK and Creditreform in Germany.  These two firms are recognised as among the leading credit 
rating and business information agencies in both countries. All identified company records were sub-
sequently screened to exclude those firms whose business activities suggested that they were not pri-
marily engaged in producing and developing new products, services or processes. As a result, 2,671 
firms in UK and 5,045 firms in Germany, respectively, were retained as eligible for inclusion in the re-
search sample. In each country, we select a total of 2,000 firms for inclusion in the survey using a 
stratified random sampling process (i.e. stratified by size class and service/manufacturing categorisa-
tion).  
The mail survey was started in October 1997. It resulted in 232 usable10 questionnaires for Germany 
and 362 for the UK. While there is a difference of response rates between the countries (24% of eligi-
ble firms in the UK; 14% in Germany), the response rates within the strata were distributed in a simi-
lar way.  This common pattern suggested a low selectivity bias in the response behaviour of firms for 
both countries. 
                                                 
10  Researchers were meticulous in checking the validity of each respondent before including them in the final 
data set.  For example, all management buy-outs or firms in high tech sectors but performing low tech activi-
ties, i.e. distribution, were removed from the accepted samples. 
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2.2 The Incidence of Internationalisation 
The nascent firm is formed and 
subsequently evolves in an envi-
ronment typically characterised by 
multiple sources of risk and uncer-
tainty.  The potency of the threat 
of such actual and potential preda-
tions is seen in the statistics that 
confirm that the majority of small 
and medium sized firms do not 
survive long enough to enjoy their 
10th anniversary (Storey 1994a).  
In this context, the preparedness 
of young technology entrepre-
neurs to accept a major additional 
source of potential threat to their 
immature and vulnerable busi-
nesses by embarking on interna-
tional sales is remarkable.   
Therefore, our first (and arguably 
most important) finding is that in-
ternational activity is the norm for 
a majority of young technology 
based firms.  Firms with a solely domestic market focus are the minority and over time become an in-
creasing exception to the rule.  This conclusion holds true for the NTBF populations of both Germany 
and the UK even after acknowledging that the data collection process is likely to have had a positive 
bias towards selecting internationalising firms.   
Indeed, researchers in both countries 
found the execution of a matched 
pair sampling frame required mate-
rial effort to ensure the identification 
and involvement of an appropriate 
number of domestic-only, survey re-
spondents, i.e. non internationalisers.  
In short, it was harder to find firms 
which had not internationalised than 
firms which had.  Overall, just over 
half of our total sample (57%) had 
internationalised (Germany 55%, 
UK 60%) at the time of the survey.  
Moreover, they had internationalised 
very rapidly. One in five firms in our 
sample had started to sell abroad 
within the first year after start-up. 
German firms internationalised more 
quickly than their British counterparts.  This may well be a reflection of the greater proximity of other 
neighbouring national markets enjoyed by continental European countries.  None the less, over time, 
the export intensity of British firms (43%), when measured by the existence of international sales in at 
least three countries, was over twice that of German firms (21%).  However, these broad statistics are 
better redefined and interpreted in the light of the characteristics of the firm, its management and its 
markets.  These interpretations are developed below. 
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Table 2-1:  
The Percentage of Firms Internationalising  
by Employment Size Category (in %) 
 Number of employees at start-up * 
Country <=5 6-9 10-19 >=20 Total 
UK 58.1 76.0 90.2 85.2 60.8 
Germany 49.7 72.6 77.0 82.6 54.9 
Total 52.9 73.5 79.3 83.4 57.0 
 Number of employees in 1997* 
Country <=5 6-9 10-19 >=20 Total 
UK 52.0 51.7 65.2 76.1 60.5 
Germany 34.5 58.4 65.1 63.4 54.6 
Total 40.5 55.7 65.1 68.4 56.7 
Weighted results; * full-time equivalents 
Source: ZEW, WBS, own calculation. 
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Table 2-2:  
International Activities of Firms 
 Total 
Sample 
UK Germany
% of firms with international sales 56.7 60.4 54.6 
Time lag between start-up and international sales (years) 1.84 2.22 1.63 
Time lag between first domestic sales and international sales (years) 1.34 1.53 1.24 
% of firms with international sales into at least three countries 29.0 43.3 21.2 
% of firms that generating at least 10% of revenues through international sales 40.0 46.8 36.2 
% of firms that generating at least 50% of revenues through international sales 14.8 22.7 10.4 
Weighted results; Source: ZEW & LBS, LBS own calculation. 
2.3 Key Characteristics of the Sampled Firms 
Importance of Size 
The vast majority of the 
sampled firms started 
small with over 80% 
having less than 5 FTE 
(full time equivalent) 
employees at start-up.  
They also remained 
small with only one fifth 
of all firms sampled in 
1997 growing to reach a 
workforce greater than 
20 FTE employees.  The 
average and median 
sales turnovers for the 
start year and last year 
(1997) also indicate that 
the majority of new 
businesses remain rela-
tively small throughout 
their lives. 
The above figures Table 
2-3 show that German 
companies tend to have larger sales values in the year of formation.  Thus, German enterprises start 
larger both in sales and employment terms.   
However, over time the UK firms appear to catch up the earlier German lead.  Given the above two 
tables deal with categorical distributions or aggregate statistics, they do not show individual data re-
garding the fastest growth companies.  At the firm level, regardless of whichever criterion was used, 
i.e. employment or sales, the most rapidly growing companies were predominantly UK in origin.  
However, again caution is necessary.  The survey was undertaken when German was still coming out 
of a major recession in the mid 1990s.  The UK had lead most of continental Europe by entering and 
leaving this international recession more early than the other European states.  Discrepancies in the 
means or medians may well reflect a lag effect in the economic cycles of the two countries.  However, 
this explanation cannot deal with the predominance of UK companies among the most rapidly growing 
outliers. 
As has been shown repeatedly in SME studies, it is only a minority of firms which metamorphose into 
substantial businesses.  The fact that the majority of these NTBFs started and remained as micro-firms 
Table 2-3:  
Distribution of Firm Size at Start-up and in 1997 (in %) 
Number of  Start-up 1997 
employees* UK Germany Total UK Germany Total 
Less than 5 88.1 80.0 82.9 25.7 28.0 27.2 
6-9 7.3 11.4 9.9 28.5 23.8 25.5 
10-19 2.2 6.0 4.7 22.2 27.9 25.9 
More than 20 2.4 2.7 2.6 23.6 20.3 21.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Weighted results; * full-time equivalents. 
Source: ZEW & LBS, LBS own calculation. 
Table 2-4:  
Size of Sample Firms in Revenue Figures  
(excluding Firms Started after 1995) 
ECUs Revenue in  
Year of First Sales 
Revenue at  
Last Financial Year (1997) 
 UK German UK German 
Mean Revenues 362,585 417,124 1,685,584 1,690,141 
Median Revenues 163,043 268,354 896,739 1,037,975 
Source: ZEW & LBS, LBS own calculation. 
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(i.e. 10 workers or less) raises questions about the possibly low threshold of the ‘minimum efficient 
scale’ for a viable technology-based business.  Conversely, it may be argued that NTBFs are obliged 
to start below an efficient size because of the problems of capital rationing.  At start-up, German firms 
are slightly larger than their UK peers.  However, this size difference erodes and even slightly reverses 
by 1997.  Within the context of the research study’s focus, firm size is of great significance as it is 
clearly evident that it is positively associated with the degree of internationalisation.  Three-quarters of 
all firms of 10 employees and above had, at the time of the survey, almost one quarter (23%) of their 
total sales revenues coming from foreign customers.  The only exceptions to the general trend of a 
very high export orientation among NTBFs were the East German firms in the sample.  For historical 
reasons, these firms were more domestically oriented.  However, the figures also suggest that this 
more parochial but rational choice is likely to change over time as the competitive skills of these firms 
develop in line with their Western counterparts. 
Industry Differences 
There are some signifi-
cant industry differences 
between the firms sur-
veyed.  Five aggregate 
sector classifications 
were used: software; 
ICT-hardware (infor-
mation and commu-
nication technology); en-
gineering; health (phar-
maceuticals, medical 
equipment); and ‘Oth-
ers’.  However, with the 
general exception of soft-
ware/non-software distinctions, industry classification proved to be a less than useful variable for 
analysis.  Industry classification appeared to act in a range of directions and helped to explain out-
comes not explained by other variables.  Yet, industrial classification did not prove to be a robust dis-
criminator nor a consistently useful explanatory variable.    For example, while software firms started 
relatively large in the UK, in Germany they were the smallest industry category at start-up.  Software 
firms were essentially more likely to be customised in their relationships to users and clients.  This had 
the consequence of limiting the internationalisation capabilities of this industrial category.  However, 
the researchers were impressed by how many software and service based firms had internationalised. 
There were also, as expected, notable country/industry interactions.  For example, when measured by 
relative annualised growth rates, German engineering firms excelled as did British ICT-hardware 
firms.  Both sector and country differences persist when firms are assessed by their share of interna-
tional sales.  Software firms remain much more local than either ICT-hardware or health sector firms.  
This is true for both Germany and the UK.  However, British high tech, young firms are typically 
more international across all sectors. 
 
Table 2-5:  
Start-up Size, Size in 1997 and Average Annual Growth Rates by Industry 
Industry Average number of 
employees at start-up*
Average number of 
employees in 1997* 
Average annual 
growth rate (in %) 
 UK Germany UK Germany UK Germany
Software 4.0 3.7 16.1 13.3 22.5 22.1 
ICT-Hardware 3.0 5.1 17.3 14.9 25.5 18.3 
Engineering 3.1 3.9 11.7 13.7 22.4 26.4 
Health. 4.2 5.6 17.6 17.9 22.7 24.1 
Other 4.7 7.7 16.7 19.6 22.5 18.0 
Weighted results; * full-time equivalents. 
Source: ZEW & LBS, own calculation. 
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R&D Investment 
Sector and country differences 
persist when measuring the 
knowledge base of the respon-
dent firms.  What is immedi-
ately evident is that these young 
firms are almost invariably 
characterised by extremely high 
R&D investments when defined 
by either R&D expenses as a 
percentage of total sales, R&D 
employment as a percentage of 
total workforce, or the percent-
age of the workforce holding 
university degrees.  While UK 
firms appear to engage more 
frequently in R&D activities, 
individual German firms, when 
they do undertake R&D, tend to 
invest more resources in this ac-
tivity.  For the 88% of UK and 
79% of German respondents 
which under-take R&D, these 
firms are nearly twice as likely 
to conduct research activities on 
a permanent rather than an occa-
sional basis.  Thus, they demon-
strate a very real commitment to 
knowledge accumulation despite 
the scarcity and cost of re-
sources for the micro or small 
firm.  It can be demonstrated 
that it is the permanence of the 
R&D activity that is important 
for internationalisation activity.  Approximately 70% of firms undertaking permanent R&D also have 
international sales.  The incidence of internationalisation drops to under 50% of sampled firms when 
they undertake only occasional or no R&D activity. 
 
Management Characteristics 
The analyses indicated the importance of the previous professional experience/human capital of the 
managers who had founded the NTBFs.  Founder specific characteristics are particularly important in 
determining and predicting the likelihood of the firm internationalising.  Over 60% of all firms are 
started with one or two founder members.  German entrepreneurs have a greater preference than their 
UK counterparts for starting enterprises with a larger management team of four to six persons.  This is 
partly a reflection of the larger number of software companies started in Germany.   
There was a very high incidence in both countries of managers having worked together prior to start-
ing the current (surveyed) business.  This common history increases the chances of the firm having in-
ternational sales.  This direct effect is however, significantly smaller than the effect of previous work 
experience.  When a firm is founded by managers who have previously worked abroad or who have 
been employed by an international firm, there is a very marked increase in the propensity to interna-
tionalise.  This is particularly the case with British firms.  Interestingly, if a respondent was educated 
Figure 2:  
 Medians of R&D Intensity and Human Capital Intensity 
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abroad, this event had a notably less 
powerful impact on influencing the 
firm’s subsequent international be-
haviour.  It is perhaps surprising, 
given the relatively isolated location 
of the UK, that UK managers were 
frequently more international in per-
spective than their German counter-
parts.  This situation pertains despite 
the higher export intensity of the 
German economy when compared to 
the UK especially in high technology 
goods. 
The data suggest different sets of re-
lationships between large and small 
firms in Germany and the UK.  In 
Germany, there is a predominance of 
German owned and domiciled firms 
that sell strongly to Western and 
Eastern Europe.  Conversely, in the 
UK there are fewer large UK owned and domiciled firms to act as customers for UK high tech young 
firms.  There is, however,  in the UK a significantly greater presence of foreign owned, multinational 
firms with regional headquarters or major installations sited in the UK.  These two different environ-
ments each worked to produce clearly different effects.  German small high tech firms focused their 
strongest selling activities on large, domestic German firms.  Frequently, exports were gained as a re-
sult of the German customer requiring the supplying small firm also to service additional facilities in 
neighbouring countries.  Thus, initial domestic sales in Germany would lead to additional export sales 
for German companies - typically in Austria, the Netherlands and France.  This behaviour appeared to 
the researchers to be like a ‘convoy’ of small German firms surrounding and servicing a smaller num-
ber of major German enterprises.  The distinct impression was gained that German entrepreneurs, if 
given a choice, preferred to sell to large German firms in their domestic market.  If expanding markets 
generated foreign sales opportunities, the preference for these entrepreneurs would remain the selling 
of products and services to foreign subsidiaries of large German firms.  This need to manage uncer-
tainty by selling to long term customers from the same cultural grouping strongly corroborates behav-
ioural theories of internationalisation particularly the concept of  ‘psychic distance’. 
In contrast, the significant inward migration of multi-national companies to Britain has obliged small 
UK firms to become much more international in both customer focus and in the career histories of 
their employees.  The UK economy is smaller and there is a lesser number of substantial UK owned 
firms compared to the situation facing small German firms.  UK managers have less choice than their 
German counterparts other than to be more international in outlook even when dealing with domestic 
sales.  This relatively greater international perspective of UK managers is evidenced in both a greater 
incidence of work experience with multi-national companies and/or work experience abroad.  If Brit-
ish managers’ experience is, in part, linked to the UK’s popularity as a location for inward migrating 
firms from Asia and North America, this greater familiarity with diverse economies would help to ex-
plain the greater compass of UK international activities compared to German export behaviour. 
Lack of Managerial Skills 
The respondents were asked to determine the nature and the degree of skill shortages faced by their 
companies both at start-up and at the time of the survey.  The German firms reported relatively greater 
weaknesses in the managerial skills of finance, sales, marketing and distribution.  For the UK firms, 
relative weak-nesses were more evident in R&D and production capabilities.  The explicit nature of 
these different constraints reflects stereotypical views of the two countries’ sources of comparative 
advantage.  Over time, the German firms managed to reduce the skill shortage gap, both absolutely 
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and in relation to the UK 
firms.  Conversely, the R&D 
shortages, while remaining 
constant in absolute terms 
for the British, increased 
relative to their German 
competitors.  Transition ma-
trices indicate that UK and 
German firms differed in 
their ability to resolve initial 
resource weaknesses.   
The UK firms appeared less 
successful than their German 
counterparts in correcting in-
frastructure weaknesses over 
time.  This relative weakness 
of UK firms in comparison 
to German firms may reflect 
the different nature of scarce 
inputs in the two countries.  
In small firms, both manag-
ers and the general work-
force typically ‘learn by do-
ing’ rather than by having 
specific training.  This expe-
riential learning may be suf-
ficient for employees to 
cope with generalised mana-
gerial duties - albeit more 
inefficiently than if specifi-
cally trained for the task.  
However, such a resolution 
of labour scarcity is much 
less feasible if the task is of 
a highly specific and techni-
cal nature requiring specific 
training and detailed instruc-
tion.  German managers are 
more likely to be trained as 
engineers or in one of sev-
eral technical disciplines.  The pre-eminence given to scientific training is a long standing cultural trait 
in Germany.  Such managers can more easily ‘learn by doing’ generic managerial tasks including 
marketing and sales activities.  The same is not true of a salesman or production worker attempting to 
learn the necessarily precise technical skills of R&D activity.  Thus, the skill base and the training in-
frastructure of Germany is likely to be able to allow small high tech firms to address their specific skill 
shortages more resolutely and quickly than their UK counterparts. 
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Product Characteristics  
The products produced by both 
the German and UK respondent 
firms were primarily for indus-
trial consumption either as capi-
tal goods or as components. 
Even those products sold ready 
for use were still targeted at in-
dustrial customers. Only 5% of 
German firms and 16% of UK 
firms produced products or ser-
vices specifically for sale to the 
(non-industrial) consumer.   
This industrial focus has major 
implications for the strategies 
adopted and the resources 
needed to market, sell and dis-
tribute their products and ser-
vices successfully.  The sur-
veyed firms were specifically asked about the characteristics of their best selling products.  It was evi-
dent that the firms expended a great deal of resources on the specific design of their products, and to 
supporting point of sale and post sale activities.  This commitment of resources has both positive and 
negative consequences for the growth and internationalisation of the firm. 
The provision of prior technical consultation, customisation of products to individual clients, training 
of sales staff, upgrading of products and specific configuration to the client’s systems etc. allows the 
young firms to differentiate themselves from other and often bigger competitors.  The most common 
marketing strategy is as a ‘niche player’ and the comprehensive client services offered can allow novel 
niche positions to be created and successfully defended.  However, these services are highly expensive 
for the young and, as yet, unestablished firm to provide.  The consequent large transaction costs are 
likely to reduce the firm’s opportunity to internationalise.  These effects are also likely to vary be-
tween industry and target market. 
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The Innovativeness of Products 
In order to sell successfully into for-
eign markets, the exporting firm needs 
to be able to demonstrate some par-
ticular source(s) of competitive advan-
tage.  The research sought to deter-
mine to what extent the technical in-
novativeness of the products or ser-
vices sold by the firm is a major ele-
ment of such a strategy.  The respon-
dents were given a range of options to 
define the innovativeness of the tech-
nology which they in-corporated in 
their products and services - from 
‘tried and tested combinations of exist-
ing technology’ to ‘new technology, 
self developed’.  Both UK and German 
firms demonstrated broadly similar 
patters of technology adoption.  For 
example, the specific technology ac-
quisition strategy of ‘new technologies 
developed elsewhere’ was unpopular 
in both Germany and the UK.  This 
unpopularity was similar for all re-
spondents regardless of firm size or 
nationality.  What was striking was the 
firms’ willingness to develop their 
own technology or to experiment with 
new combinations of existing technol-
ogy.  Micro firms with under 10 FTE 
employees were particularly innova-
tive especially in Germany.  These 
findings support one of the key attrib-
utes of NTBFs, namely their ability to 
create innovative products and ser-
vices despite often operating under se-
vere resource constraints (Acs and 
Audretsch 1990). Likewise, this also 
reflects the strategic importance of technology backed market niches for NTBFs. 
Lead Times and Competitor Response 
Technology markets are typically characterised by high levels of competition and inter-firm rivalry.  
Niche strategies are one means by which young firms may seek to attenuate the level of competition 
they face during the vulnerable, early growth period.  The researchers sought to understand the period 
of monopolistic advantage during which a firm may extract super-normal profits and thereby attempt 
to recoup sufficient rents both to reward investors and to finance a next generation of products and 
services.  The research findings indicated the high level of market contestability in the commercial en-
vironments in which these micro firms exist.  A majority of firms did not expect more than 12 months’ 
lead time over competitors.  Over 80% of all surveyed firms saw this period of calm being less than 24 
months.  German firms were slightly more confident that they would enjoy more than one year’s grace 
compared to their UK counterparts.  The majority (60%) of these UK respondents saw their lead time 
being up to 12 months but not longer.  This German confidence may reflect one advantage of greater 
specialisation, namely a higher level of short run protection.  It may also be the case that a close, inte-
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grated relationship to large customers 
(i.e. big manufacturing firms) and 
their stronger focus on investment 
goods helps German NTBFs to de-
fend their market niches more easily. 
Conversely, it may suggest that ri-
valry in German markets remain less 
fierce than in the UK for these chosen 
sectors.  Importantly, firms that con-
duct permanent R&D are likely to 
gain a 50% longer period of reduced 
competition when compared to their 
peers that undertake only occasional 
or no R&D investments.  This finding 
is true for both countries.   
However, analysis shows that the 
concept of lead time interacts with 
market size.  Larger markets tend to 
be characterised by more competitors, 
higher strategic stakes and more rapid 
competitive responses to new entrants.  A more truncated lead time is also associated with companies 
which grow faster, and have the opportunity to do so in these larger markets.  This brevity of the lead 
time and thus market opportunity is a more significant factor than access to international markets as an 
explanation of rapid growth.  The imminent arrival of competitors is a catalyst for the rapid exploita-
tion of the transient economic advantage for the first incumbent in a market.  Competitive economies 
create firms which grow more rapidly. 
Where the UK and German high tech young firms differ is in the relationship between internationali-
sation and lead time.  In the UK, this period of opportunity or respite from competition is smaller for 
internationally active firms.  The opposite is true for Germany.  The UK experience would suggest that 
internationalisation is a response to competitive threat and the vulnerability of remaining exclusively 
in one, highly contested, home market.  In Germany, technology based market niches in the home 
market seems to be a prerequisite for international expansion.  This again is in line with the observa-
tion that internationalisation of sales is part of a pro-active marketing strategy of the British firms 
whereas German firms often enter international markets as a response to customer’s demand. 
Motivation for Internationalisation 
There are a number of both competing and complementary explanations as to why young and small 
firms would assume the uncertainties and risks of internationalisation.  Demand based arguments fo-
cus on the limited capacity of the domestic market to absorb the existing and future production of the 
growing firms.  Issues of limited lead time or the short technology trajectory are also demand based ra-
tionalisations for seeking to maximise the revenues available from international sales while the prod-
uct still has a technological or related advantage.  The attraction of the US market, particularly for 
technology firms, may be explained as a ‘signalling or reputation effect’.  What is signalled is the ex-
cellence of a product which can survive and flourish not just in the firm’s domestic market but also in 
the single most sophisticated and demanding market for high tech products and services in the world.   
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The respondents were given a 
range of five choices to best ex-
plain their internationalisation 
activities.  The additional sales 
revenue potential of foreign 
markets was the single most 
common explanation, account-
ing for over 60% of all re-
sponses.  This was followed by 
the limitations of the home 
market.  This was a response 
offered by around a quarter of 
all firms.  This latter response 
would suggest that firms are not 
only ‘pulled’ by the advantages 
of additional sales revenue from 
internationalisation but that 
they are also ‘pushed’ beyond 
their domestic market by the 
limitations of its size.  It is 
worth noting that Germany is 
the single largest economy in 
the European Union.  Yet, 30% of the German respondents still saw this economy as being too small 
to fulfil their sales ambitions.  Compared to these two dominant justifications, reputation, learning and 
amortisation of sunk costs remain relatively trivial responses at under 10% each for all firms.   
The single exception is that 18% of German firm respondents did value reputation as an important mo-
tive.  This latter finding may be explained as a traditional signalling effect among German firms and 
the German public.  With the exception of only three years in the period post 1950, Germany has al-
ways run an annual trade surplus.  Export activity is closely associated in the minds of industry ob-
servers and the German public as a highly desirable and laudable activity.  Firms that have significant 
export sales are deemed to produce products and services of international competitiveness, i.e. outputs 
of high quality. 
Strategic Commitment to Internationalisation 
Whether or not firms are pushed or pulled actively into international markets, the evidence is that it is 
not an ill considered or serendipitous activity for the majority of firms.  Over half of UK (65%) and 
German (53%) firms had made a commitment to international sales in their business plans before they 
had actually embarked on foreign sales.  Health sector firms in both countries were most likely to have 
a prior commitment to internationalisation and ICT-hardware firms had the least prior commitment.  
However, these effects are less marked in Germany where less firms made ex ante commitments.  
Also statistically significant in the UK but not in Germany were the findings that firm size and the ex-
istence of an R&D activity were both positively associated with a prior commitment to internationali-
sation.  However, it should be noted that 35% of firms did not have internationalisation plans and yet 
still internationalised in practice.  Thus, the indicative strength of prior commitments should be viewed 
with some circumspection.  In reality, for many respondents, internationalisation is a somewhat arbi-
trary and random process regardless of the existence or absence of formal plans.  The uncertainty en-
demic to this process inevitably incurs costs and wasted resources.  Thus, there may be a supportable 
argument for greater state assistance as a means of attenuating these costs, and thus the barriers, of 
early internationalisation. 
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Costs and Constraints of Entering Foreign Markets 
When a firm embarks on international 
sales, it incurs a range of additional 
costs primarily related to country spe-
cific adaptations.  These costs are not 
necessarily proportional to the scale of 
the foreign activity.   They are fre-
quently ‘sunk’, i.e. irreversible.  For ex-
ample, the cost of translating sales and 
operator manuals into a foreign lan-
guage is not dependent on the number 
of sales subsequently made.  Indeed, a 
large proportion of the total cost has 
frequently to be committed before any 
revenue is generated.  If the firm later 
pulls out of the market or discontinues 
the described product, there is no resid-
ual value in the material.  The burden of 
these additional costs would suggest young and small firms would not, or should not, internationalise 
until they are larger, better resourced and more established.  Our findings show that, however plausible 
this premise, it is not the reality for NTBFs in either Germany or the UK.  Internationalisation in the 
norm for a majority of young firms and is undertaken very early in their life cycle.  These decisions 
appear to be made despite of the additional costs incurred. 
The actual nature of the costs of internationalisation incur-red seems to be similar across the two coun-
tries.  Building up relationships, product launch activities and investing in sales distribution channels 
were judged by the majority of respondents to be the biggest sources of costs.  Germans were more fo-
cused on the cost of relationships while the British were relatively more concerned at the expense of 
building sales channels.  This difference may well reflect the more bespoke or customised focus of the 
products and services of German firms in addition to their different geographies.  Given this prod-
uct/market strategy, ensuring the closeness of customer contact becomes an imperative.  Conversely, 
for the more standardised products of the British respondents, creating efficient trade channels is a 
greater priority. When it came to describing the constraints which firms had experienced in undertak-
ing international activities, respondents noted the additional country-specific costs and risks, in addi-
tion to the difficulties stemming 
from their limited, personal ex-
perience of international activi-
ties.  However, the most impor-
tant constraint was seen as the 
scarcity of (existing) manage-
ment time and the additional 
demands that internationalisation 
would make on key executive 
staff.  With firms continuing to 
experience shortages in sales, 
distribution and marketing re-
sources, this concern is not un-
expected.  Just as the German 
firms were relatively more pre-
occupied with issues of risk, the 
UK firms were particularly con-
cerned at the problem of scarce 
management time.  This finding 
is consistent with the fact that 
UK firms tend to start with 
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smaller management teams than their German peers, and that they also appear to operate in a less re-
sponsive, domestic labour market than the German firms. 
Summary Descriptive Statistics 
A summary of the descriptive statistics of the surveyed companies is given in Table 2-6. What is im-
mediately noteworthy in this summary table is that firm/founder/product differences are frequently 
more evident between internationalising and non-internationalising firms, which may be of either na-
tionality, than between German and UK firms per se.  This leads us to believe that there are strong in-
fluences which impact on the manner in which firms behave once they start to sell in international, 
technology focused marketplaces.  These operational influences appear more powerful than the na-
tional characteristics which initially define and separate young German or UK firms.  To transpose the 
terminology from a different debate, ‘nurture’ appears more influential than ‘nature’.  However, de-
scriptive data were not sufficient to answer the research questions set by either practice or theory. 
Thus, the survey data were subjected to a series of multivariate analyses structured around the major 
research themes of the incidence, the degree, the speed, and the impact of internationalisation activi-
ties. 
Table 2-6: 
Summary Statistics  
 UK Firms 
German 
Firms 
Firms with 
International 
Sales 
Firms without 
International 
Sales 
Firm characteristics:     
International Sales (%) 60.0 55.0   
 West German Firm (%)  40.8   
 East German Firm (%)  14.2   
Employment at start-up (FTEs) 3.8 4.6   5.1  3.3 
Employment in 1998 (FTEs) 15.8 14.7 17.5 11.9 
Age of the Firm (1999)   6.4   5.8   6.5   5.4 
Venture Capital Backed (%)   8.9   8.8 11.2   5.7 
Public Grants Recipient (%) 13.6 21.2 20.3 16.2 
Founder Characteristics:     
Work experience abroad (%) 51.4 29.7 44.0 29.0 
Work experience in MNC (%) 46.2 37.4 48.0 30.7 
Education abroad (%) 12.9 15.5 16.1 12.6 
Number of Founders (%):     
  - 2-3 45.7 28.8 28.6 43.1 
  - 3-4 18.1 29.8 29.4 20.6 
  - 5 and more 5.3 6.9 7.6 4.8 
R&D Activities:     
R&D employment share ( %) 26.1 27.0 28.0 25.0 
R&D performed occasionally (%) 28.8 33.1 25.2 40.1 
R&D performed permanently (%) 56.8 45.7 61.4 34.3 
Product Characteristics:     
Degree of Customisation (%) 32.8 29.4 27.7 34.3 
Age of Product (years)   4.9   4.8   5.2   4.4 
Share of best selling product (%)     
  - 30-60% 34.6 34.9 38.8 29.5 
  - 60-80% 31.0 39.8 28.0 48.0 
  - 80-100% 15.4 12.5 16.8 09.2 
Capital good (%) 34.4 51.6 49.7 38.3 
Intermediate good / service (%) 28.7 15.6 21.0 20.3 
Window of opportunity     
  Larger than 1 year (%) 52.6 60.3 64.7 48.2 
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2.4 Framework for Multivariate Analyses: Dimensions of Interna-
tionalisation 
Ascertaining whether or not a particular firm or group of firms has internationalised has rather limited 
utility.  In addition to the occurrence of internationalisation, other factors such as the degree and tim-
ing of internationalisation add valuable additional information. Thus, the research attempted to meas-
ure and understand the processes of internationalisation through several different, albeit related, lens.  
Above all, the various dimensions of internationalisation were finally assessed in terms of their effects 
on a series of performance variables. 
 As a first dimension we look at the occurrence of internationalisation. One possible measure of 
internationalisation could classify firms as “international” as soon as they have entered one foreign 
market or generated one percent of their total revenue through international sales during their last 
financial year. This operationalisation undoubtedly includes many firms that only had a few unso-
licited orders from abroad and do not pro-actively internationalise. We therefore introduce two 
cut-offs to operationalise the somewhat fuzzy notion of “substantial” international activities. We 
therefore choose a threshold of 10% non-domestic revenue. The second cut-off criterion includes 
only firms that have entered at least three foreign markets at the time of the survey. 
 There is considerable debate in the literature about the appropriate definition of the degree of in-
ternationalisation of a firm (see Sullivan 1994, Reuber and Fischer 1997). The literature convinc-
ingly demonstrates that internationalisation is a multidimensional construct and is not fully cap-
tured using a single measure such as the share of non-domestic revenue. However, in the absence 
of a preferable measure, we use the share of non-domestic revenues as the key measure of the de-
gree of internationalisation.  
 The timing of foreign market entry has received relatively minor attention from researchers. 
One reason might be the lack of adequate data when using samples of established firms. However, 
start-ups should represent an ideal test bed for exploring issues related to the timing of the initia-
tion of foreign entry modes. The dependent variable for this analysis will be the time lag between 
the first sales of the firm and the first international sales.  
Note that these three dimensions, occurrence to internationalise, degree of internationalisation and tim-
ing of internationalisation are closely related. The first dimension treats internationalisation as a binary 
choice of the firm. The second explores whether internationalisation is a continuous phenomenon, i.e. 
whether the same factors that discriminate between international start-ups and domestic start-ups also 
explain the variation of different levels or degrees of international activities. The third can be seen as 
an extension of the first dimension in a more dynamic context.  
 A further dimension of internationalisation, the choice of market entry mode, is also investi-
gated. As discussed above, the contradictions of different international business theories when ap-
plied to firms that are young and high-tech become particularly clear when looking at the choice 
of entry mode.  
Finally, we will look at two indicators, the productivity and the growth of the firm, in order to assess 
the impact that internationalisation has on firm performance. When analysing productivity growth 
we use the standard Cobb-Douglas production function framework which is augmented by the interna-
tionalisation status and a number of other productivity enhancing factors. The growth of the firm is 
measured in terms of average annual change in sales between the first full business year and the most 
recent year for which data are available. Likewise, we define employment growth as the average an-
nual growth of employment between the time of the survey and start-up.  
Determinants of Internationalisation 
In constructing our research questions, we believed that the various dimensions of internationalisation 
are expected to be a function of firm size, international experience of the founders, external finance, 
technology intensity, innovativeness of the product or service, the extent to which products are cus-
tomised, and the costs of commercialisation. Accordingly, these factors were defined and operational-
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ised with reference to extant lit-
erature in order to generate the 
necessary information via our 
data gathering. 
Both the age of the firm, and its 
size have in the past been used 
as operationalisations of stage 
theories. Furthermore, the in-
ternational experience is used to 
explain the entry mode choice. 
Also within  a behaviouralist  
tradition is the use of the man-
agement’s international experi-
ence as a substitute for the di-
rect international experience of 
the firm. The variables derived 
from a transaction cost perspec-
tive are those metrics which de-
termine the product-specific 
costs of commercialisation. 
Technology intensity has also 
been used in the past to opera-
tionalise situations character-
ised by high levels of uncertainty and asset specificity both of which give rise to transaction costs. The 
variables concerning management’s skills and experiences, external equity and the innovativeness of 
the technology embodied in the products represent firm-specific assets that are imperfectly imitable 
and can therefore be seen as operationalisations of the resource-based framework.  
The highlighted theories and their influence on dimensions of internationalisation and firm perform-
ance are graphically summarised in Figure 11. 
Firm size is operationalised as log values of the number of employees or sales. Since the actual firm 
size at the time of the survey could at the same time represent the cause and effect of international ac-
tivities, we primarily used size at start-up in our regressions in order to avoid possible effects of en-
dogeneity in the models.  
International work experience was operationalised by asking the respondents in the questionnaire 
whether they had previously lived abroad, whether they had work experience with an internationally 
operating firm and/or whether they were educated abroad. The respondent’s answers to all three ques-
tions have then been included as dummy variables in the models.  
In accordance with standard practice (e.g. Butchart 1987, OECD 1997), we chose two indicators to 
measure technology intensity. We asked respondents to state technology intensity measuring i) R&D 
expenditure as percentage of total turnover and ii) R&D employees as share of total firm employment. 
In addition, the innovativeness of the technology employed was measured using a four-item scale. Re-
spondents were asked whether their products were best classified as “incorporating tried and tested 
combinations of existing technology”, “new combinations of existing technology”, “novel technology 
developed externally” or “novel technology developed specifically for this product by the company”.  
The extent to which a product requires client-specific customisation and the transaction costs in-
curred during the sales process were each measured using a 5 point Likert scale. The four items 
measuring transaction costs (pre-sales consulting intensity, installation intensity, maintenance inten-
sity, training intensity) were then combined into a single item.  
Dummy variables have also been coded to indicate industry affiliation. We distinguish five industry 
groups. The grouping of industries is primarily determined by the similarity of the nature of competi-
tion and the dominant form of customer relations and not by the similarity of technical production pro-
cesses (see Table A-1 for details).  
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The involvement of venture capitalists, business angels and public grants is simply captured by a 
dummy variable taking the value ‘one’ if those methods of financing are present at start-up or at the 
time of the survey. The degree of financial involvement (i.e. ownership) by venture capitalists or busi-
ness angels in the respondent firms turned out to be problematic because the extent of their involve-
ment was interpreted by respondents in different ways.  The different understanding of these terms 
was particularly evident between German and UK firms.  
Finally, we regard macroeconomic influences as potentially important determinants of the firm’s ap-
proach to international sales. Therefore, we integrated data on traditional, country-specific trade flows 
obtained for EUROSTAT as well as country GDP and risk data which were obtained from the IMF’s 
World Investment Report and the publication Institutional Investor. 
2.5 Occurrence of Internationalisation 
A Simple Comparison 
As noted, the above statistics are descriptive rather than analytical in nature.  However, they can act as 
a precursor to more powerful modes of statistical interrogation of the data.  One of the most important 
innovations in the methodology of this research project is that it employs ‘matched samples’ across a 
large number of firms.  Thus, we are able to compare respondent firms which are similar in size, age, 
sector etc. but are different in that one firm has international sales and the matched firm has only do-
mestic sales.  Using Probit regression and its more sophisticated variant, multinomial logit regression, 
we are able to use the binary or ‘n’ states, respectively, of the dependent variable (or outcome) to in-
vestigate the influence of independent variables of interest.  For example, the Probit model is used to 
determine the direction of influence and the significance of a number of variables on the binomial 
choice,  i.e. to internationalise or not to internationalise. 
The Probit model was run as a multivariate analysis which encompassed country, firm and product 
specific variables (see Table D-1).  These variables had been identified from theoretical literature, and 
from the pilot interviews undertaken prior to the main survey.  The model was run on both the com-
bined data and the German and UK data separately.  In all three cases, the model allowed over 75% 
accuracy of classification.  Thus, this model, describing the differences of internationalisers and non-
internationalisers, was one of the most robust outcomes of the study.  It can be used with considerable 
accuracy to predict whether or not a firm is likely to embark on international sales activity.  
The results for the combined Anglo-German sample indicate that the following factors significantly 
increased the probability of a firm internationalising: 
• The firm is West German or British in origin (i.e. not from the former East Germany) 
• The firm is in any industry apart from software and IT services (only relevant for ‘Other’ products 
in Germany) 
• The firm is older  
• The firm is larger (measured in terms of the number of FTE employees  at start-up) 
• The firm has a higher level of R&D intensity as measured by sales turnover (only significant for 
UK firms) 
• The firm’s management has both experience in working abroad and/or has worked for a multi-
national company 
• The product embraces novel technology (only significant for UK firms) 
Some product characteristics - however only statistically significant for UK firms - impede the oppor-
tunities to internationalise. These are: 
1. The product is ‘highly customised’  
2. The product is a ‘consumer good’  
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3. The product is an ‘end-product’  
These results suggest that the ‘archetype’ internationalising NTBF is highly sophisticated.  It is larger 
and older than its peers.  It is producing specialist products across a range of related industries for de-
manding industrial users.  In order to produce these products, the firm invests intensively in R&D and 
encourages the use of novel technologies taken either from its own or other industries.  These products 
are not customised, one-off designs for one or a few customers but incorporate significant design and 
customer experience allowing their rapid installation and use across a wide range of users. 
The analyses11 also allow differences between UK and German firms to be highlighted.  The regularity 
of R&D is a factor increasing the propensity of German firms to  internationalise but does not signifi-
cantly influence the actions of UK firms.  However, those UK firms which invest more in R&D as a 
percentage of sales are also more likely to internationalise.  This direct relationship between invest-
ment in R&D and internationalisation did not hold true for German firms.  Similarly, UK firms which 
employ more innovative technologies are also more active internationalisers.  In Germany the innova-
tiveness of the technology does not help to discriminate between internationalisers and non-
internationalisers.  These findings suggest a relatively more sophisticated industrial home market in 
Germany than in the UK. 
The negative effects on internationalisation of high customisation or products designed for consumers 
or end-users appear to only be significant for UK firms.  This disparity between the UK and German 
results may well be influenced by the more limited number of German survey records.  Further, the in-
ternationalisation process may be qualitatively different in the two countries.  For Germany, sharing 
contiguous borders with fellow European nations, the act of internationalising sales may be less dis-
ruptive or managerially demanding than for the sea bound and geographically more insular British. In 
addition, as suggested by our case study evidence, existing large domestic customers play an important 
role in the internationalisation of German start-ups.  Products customised for these large firms in do-
mestic markets may also fit well the needs of their foreign subsidiary companies. 
A More Complex Comparison including Internationalisation ‘Thresholds’ 
The adoption of the concept of ‘thresholds’ of internationalisation allows the findings to be segregated 
between casual or chance internationalisers and more committed firms which have devoted substantial 
resources to internationalisation.  The threshold was set at i) at least three foreign countries entered 
(see Table C-1), and ii) a minimum of 10% of total revenues from international sales (see Table C-1).  
The model compares these two levels of commitment to the base case of no international sales.  Both 
model variants provide similar results to the Probit analysis but the specific threshold of three foreign 
markets produces a more analytically rewarding model. 
That the number of international country markets entered is a better discriminator than the percentage 
of international sales is a useful finding in its own right, particularly for future researchers.  What the 
multinomial regression allows us to develop is the concept of a minimum threshold for successful in-
ternationalisation activity.  With the exception of the innovativeness of the technology which has a dif-
ferent effect in each of the two countries, customisation, regularity of R&D, international professional 
experience of the founders and the age of the firm are the key discriminators between internationalis-
ers and non-internationalisers.  However, the result of this analysis is to show that these variables have 
a significantly greater effect when the firm is involved in three or more international markets.  The 
full power of these variables comes into play after the firm has crossed the barrier of casual, ‘happen-
chance’ internationalisation. 
                                                 
11  The full specifications of the multivariate models discussed are given in Appendix D. 
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2.6 Degree of Internationalisation 
The above models deal with predicting whether or not a firm is likely to internationalise given its leg-
acy of firm, product and market characteristics.  The introduction of a threshold of International sales 
raises the issue of what determines the degree or extent of internationalisation activity. 
For the purposes of this study, the degree of internationalisation is taken as the share of non-domestic 
revenues of the firm.  There is a roughly equal chance that German and UK firms will internationalise 
over time.  However, the descriptive statistics show that UK firms appear to have a significantly 
greater mean share (38%) of non-domestic revenue than their German counterparts (25%).  These dif-
ferences are material and add to the importance of also viewing internationalisation as a scale of activ-
ity. 
Table 2-7: 
Descriptive Statistics on the Degree of Internationalisation 
Country Total Sample UK Germany 
Variable (in %)  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Share of non-domestic revenue 33.9 23 38.4 30 24.8 15 
Number of countries entered 9.6 6 10.0 6 8.0 5 
% of firms with greater foreign than do-
mestic revenues 
28.5  34.4  16.8  
Source: ZEW & LBS, own calculation. 
Two models were used to explore the issue of degree of internationalisation - an OLS regression (see 
Table D-4) and a Tobit regression (see Table D-6).  The former model uses only the data from the in-
ternationalising companies whereas the Tobit model can also utilise the data from non-
internationalisers.  Both models predict correctly that German firms will have lower international sales 
than the UK sample firms.  East German firms are likewise shown to be less likely to internationalise 
than their Western compatriots.  Thus, the models confirm the empirical reality. 
The size of the firms at start-up does not influence the degree of international sales (whereas this vari-
able did influence the propensity to internationalise).  However, engineering and life science sectors 
are more international than the base case of software.  The longer the firm has had foreign sales, i.e. 
the greater its experience, the higher the level of internationalisation is likely to be.  Co-operation with 
overseas or foreign partners is also a strong indication of higher international sales.  The effect of 
technology intensity continues to be different for UK and German firms.  In the UK, the level of R&D 
expenditures has a significant positive effect as does employing more advanced technology in the 
products exported.  Neither of these factors increased the non-domestic sales of the German firms.  
The UK findings suggest a curvi-linear relationship with the degree of internationalisation increasing 
with the novelty of the technology but having its optimum effect before the most advanced form of 
technology is employed.   
Unlike the earlier analyses, product characteristics do not strongly influence the level of international 
sales.  German firms with a high share of non-domestic revenue were more likely to sell capital goods 
but customisation, installation and maintenance requirements do not effect the degree of international 
sales.  This result would suggest again a threshold effect that once passed was no longer a factor.  The 
provision of venture capital finance increased the level of international revenues but was only signifi-
cant in the UK.  The receipt of public grants was not significant and, for the UK firms, the coefficient 
suggested that a grant was more likely to be associated with less international sales.  This was not the 
case in Germany where no significant result was recorded in either direction. 
The Tobit model takes the probability of internationalisation into account before estimating the degree 
of internationalisation.  As well as confirming the findings of the OLS model, it also indicates the im-
portance of managerial skill shortages in reducing the level of international activities.  This resource 
constraint only effected UK firms.  The analyses confirmed the current importance of experience ac-
cumulated over time from selling abroad.  For the British, pro-active behaviour coupled with advanced 
technology and innovative product solutions has a positive impact.  This result was not found among 
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German firms in the sample.  Finally, while there are significant differences among East and West 
German firms regarding the probability of internationalising, once the East German firm has crossed 
the threshold of embarking on international sales, there are no differences in their likely share of non-
domestic sales. 
2.7 Timing of Entry into International Markets 
One of our most remarkable findings has been how quickly (as well as how extensively) young tech-
nology based firms seek to expand their markets to other countries.  The dynamics of this phenomenon 
were examined using a ‘hazard function’ methodology which estimates the conditional probability of a 
firm having international sales in year t, given that it had no international sales in year t-1.  This prob-
ability of international activity continued to be explored using the same independent variables, i.e. 
firm, management and product factors, by which the decision to internationalise was appraised.  This 
hazard model was subsequently compared to a timing entry analysis which used a multinomial logit 
regression to differentiate between three respondent firm ‘states’, i.e. born-international, late-
internationalisers, and those firms expecting to internationalise at some future date. 
These analyses confirm the 
descriptive statistics.  The 
timing of international sales 
is broadly similar in Germany 
and the UK with the former 
country tending to be a more 
active internationaliser in the 
earlier (first five) years.  This 
may be because the barriers 
or sunk entry costs to foreign 
markets, including market re-
search, investment costs and 
personnel recruitment etc., 
are lower for Germany which 
tends to make initial foreign 
sales to customers sharing 
common borders.  West 
German firms internationalise 
more quickly than British 
firms which, in turn, interna-
tionalise more rapidly than East German firms. Firms from the engineering, medical and pharmaceuti-
cal sectors are quicker to cross borders in the search of additional sales.  It is likely that their products 
face low, industry specific, sunk costs.  Foreign market barriers are not high as their products are fa-
miliar to foreign purchasers who do not require complex or costly adaptations. 
The hazard functions indicate that the probability of a firm entering foreign markets increases over 
time.  Larger firms, particularly, are not only more likely to inter-nationalise but they also do so more 
quickly.  The hazard analyses also confirm the importance of firm and product characteristics.  Man-
agement experience abroad, and particularly in multinational firms, materially increased the rapidity of 
internationalisation activity.  The permanence of R&D activity, rather than the intensity of research 
investment, also had a similar effect.  Conversely, and as expected, consumer and end-user goods im-
peded the rate of international market entry.  Highly customised products are particularly difficult to 
sell abroad.  Skill shortages in sales and distribution also increased the time from domestic to foreign 
market entry.  These findings on the timing of internationalisation are highly consistent, in their im-
portance and direction of effect, to the analyses of international/non-international activity.   
Importantly, the analyses also stressed the dynamic nature of the process of internationalisation.  Ap-
proximately, three fifths of our sample had internationalised at the time of our survey – a maximum 
period of eight years.  However, this fraction of the total sample would be expected to increase still 
Figure 12:  
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further as the firms became older.  By the end of the first decade, it was estimated that 80% approxi-
mately of the sample would be international to some degree.  This finding suggests that the barriers to 
internationalisation erode over time.  Thus, the time that the young firm spends exclusively in the do-
mestic market can be viewed as a period of incubation prior to international sales.  The incubation pe-
riod may last several years but, for the majority, it is finite.  That is, sooner or later, the great majority 
of high tech young firms become international. 
The findings of the hazard analyses are a cause of optimism for those firms which do not immediately 
venture abroad.  The findings imply that, over time, increasing domestic experience can compensate 
for the lack of those specific factors, e.g. managements’ previous international experience, which tend 
to accelerate internationalisation activity.  This research finding has a particular resonance for East 
Germany.  It suggests that while East German companies may find the process of internationalisation 
initially more difficult than their West German counterparts, once in foreign markets, there is no evi-
dence to suggest any permanent performance differences exist between firms from the former two 
states. 
The act of internationalisation is ultimately a management decision.  In order to model the strategic 
choice dimension, the sample was subdivided into the four categories of i) born-international, ii) late-
international, iii) planning to internationalise, and iv) no foreseeable plans to internationalise.  The lat-
ter category was used as the reference base case for the logit regression.  With minor variations, the 
multinomial logit regression confirmed the importance of the independent variables identified in the 
hazard function analyses.  Generally, the influence of these variables was less important if the firm had 
not yet internationalised despite its intentions.  This has some positive implications.  Resource en-
dowments which encourage or discourage internationalisation appear to lose some of their influence 
over the lifetime of the firm.  Thus, for example, the size of a firm at start-up becomes less influential 
as the firm gets older.  Likewise, the barrier of intense product customisation lowers over time.  Simi-
larly, sectoral differences also decline.  This suggests that as firms increase their experience in domes-
tic markets this experience can also assist them over time to embark on the process of internationalisa-
tion.  However, this benign effect of age should not disguise the fact that greater resources at start-up, 
particularly skilled and experienced management and a product with universal utility, are major assets 
in increasing both the degree and the speed of the internationalisation process.  Particularly in new and 
emerging markets where a ‘first mover advantage’ exists, the above results should only offer little 
comfort to late-internationalisers. 
2.8 Target Countries and Mode of Entry 
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The research has indicated that NTBFs internationalise extensively and rapidly.  It can also be demon-
strated that the strategic act of internationalisation is increasingly probable over time for firms that ini-
tially saw their markets as exclusively domestic.  Thus, obvious and related questions include: to 
which countries do these internationalising firms go; and by what means (termed ‘modes’ or ‘chan-
nels’) is the internationalisation process executed? 
The respondents were asked to name the first international market entered and their three most impor-
tant international markets at the present time.  For both British and German firms, Europe (defined as 
either the European Union or the European Economic Area) was the primary focus of both initial and 
current sales.  However, Germany started and continued to be more European in sales focus than the 
UK, particularly if the emerging economies of Eastern Europe are also included.  British companies 
had a significantly higher propensity to follow established, and more geographically widespread, po-
litical and trading alliances.  History continues to be important.  This resulted in North America (USA 
and Canada) being the single largest market for the British.  France occupied this pre-eminent position 
for the Germans.  Both exporting countries widen their geographic span over time.  However, the Brit-
ish firms were more likely than their German counterparts to enter more quickly geographically and 
culturally disparate markets, e.g. Australasia and the Middle East. 
Internationalisation is uncertain, time consuming and expensive.  It is therefore especially risky for 
poorly resourced and inexperienced, young firms.  Accordingly, the selection of an appropriate mode 
of foreign market entry is a judgement of critical strategic import to the entrepreneur.  It was striking 
just how similar was the aggregate choice of entry mode of the two countries.  Both German and UK 
companies chose to employ modes that were resource extensive.  In practice, approximately 90% of 
all firms elected to export directly or via a distributor/agent.  These low cost entry mode preferences 
hardly changed over time.  The use of direct exporting or distributors/agents was and has remained the 
dominant modes for sample firms in both countries (UK 88%, Germany 82%).  What has changed is 
that firms over time have tended to substitute distributors for direct exporting as the preferred mode.  
Between first and current entry mode, direct exporting had declined from 43% to 36% of all exporting 
modes.  Conversely, the use of distributors had increased from 36% to 41%. 
Table 2-8:  
Geographical Focus of International Activities 
Unit of Analysis Firms Entries 
 UK Germany UK Germany 
Entry Mode First 
country 
entered 
% First 
country 
entered 
% 3 most im-
portant cur-
rent entries 
% 3 most im-
portant 
current en-
tries 
% 
EU/EFTA 138 57 83 74 307 56 170 68 
US & Canada 56 23 12 11 106 19 21 8 
East Asia (Japan, HK, Sing., 
Korea, Taiwan)  
14 6 4 3 37 7 14 6 
Australia & New Zealand 6 2 0 0 25 5 1 1 
Emerging Markets, Europe 2 1 10 8 12 2 22  9 
South America 3 1 0 0 3 1 4 2 
Middle East 11 5 1 1 22 4 3 1 
Emerging Markets, Asia 4 2 3 2 12 2 11 4 
Other 10 4 1 1 23 4 5 2 
Total 244 100 114 100 548 100 251 100 
Source: LBS / ZEW 1998 
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Table 2-9:  
First and Current Entry Modes 
 UK Germany 
 
Entry Mode 
First 
Entry 
% Current 
Entry 
% First 
Entry 
% Current 
Entry 
% 
Exporting 241 44 199 36 98 37 84 32 
Agents 68 12 60 11 28 14 30 12 
Distributors 198 36 227 41 91 38 96 38 
Sales joint venture 12 2 27 5 2 1 2 1 
Wholly-owned subsidiary  7 1 15 3 5 2 10 4 
Licensing 11 2 9 2 8 3 10 4 
Other 10 2 10 2 19 6 19 9 
Total 547 100 547 100 251 100 251 100 
Note: The table shows the first and current entry modes used in the most important foreign markets ( three 
maximum) for the company’s best selling product.  
Source: ZEW / LBS 1998 
The researchers chose to concentrate their analyses on these two most common modes of internation-
alisation.  For the young firms, exporting directly under their exclusive control has many advantages.  
The firms learn first hand about important markets.  Gross margins are not dissipated by having to 
share profits with distributors.  Direct action has important managerial advantages.  It is quick to or-
ganise and highly flexible in operation.  However, management has to devote scarce time and some-
times incur heavy sunk costs in order to conduct this new activity.  Critically, the channel decision 
may ultimately be taken out of the hands of the entrepreneurial managers if target customers in foreign 
markets are not prepared to deal with a new, unknown and untested company or its product.  This ad-
verse situation is termed by the authors “the liability of alienness”.  This liability may be resolved by 
utilising a distributor/agent/value-added reseller which is known and trusted by the target customer.  
The authority of the brand or franchise of the third party is extended to the companies that supply 
products via this channel.  However, this route is costly and may only be available to the larger start-
ups or those firms with conspicuously attractive products.  The harsh reality may be for the majority of 
young firms that it is the distributor which chooses the young firm - not vice versa.  
The assumption has been made throughout this research that the use of a distributor represented a 
higher level of resource commitment than direct exporting by the young firm.  As has been evidenced 
in the case studies, firms utilising distributors have to invest considerable resources into ensuring good 
channel relationships.  To be dependent on an alienated or disinterested distributor is perhaps the worst 
of all choices for a vulnerable young firm.  However, the costs of using a distributor are not restricted 
to the resources consumed.  Excessive reliance on the use of a distributor may also reduce the client 
NTBF’s opportunities of ‘learning by doing’, as well as eroding the operating margins consequent on 
any sale.  These dependent firms may well not forge the critical country and sector specific links with 
established commercial networks.  Direct involvement in such third country networks may be ulti-
mately necessary for independent survival and growth.  There is a danger that the use of a distributor 
can result in the young firm ceding significant control over its future growth trajectory to the agent or 
intermediary.  Dependency on a distributor in a key market may have major implications stemming 
from the reduced bargaining power of the internationalising firm (i.e. ‘agency costs’).  In extremis, the 
exporting firm may suffer the continued expropriation of significant rents by a distributor enjoying a 
quasi-monopolistic advantage. 
The above concerns are issues of both strategic and policy importance.  In order to determine which 
respondent firms used what particular channels of market entry and for what reason, a series of Probit 
regressions were run with the dependent variable being the binary mode choice of distributor or direct 
exporting (see Table D-1).  For the UK, but not for German firms, a greater size at start-up was associ-
ated with using the more complex mode of a distributor.  Sectors traditionally employing large sales 
forces include ICT hardware and pharmaceuticals.  For the young firm, building a large sales force 
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represents a very major market barrier.  Accordingly, respondents from these industries are more 
likely to use a distributor.  British engineering firms are also more predisposed to use distributors but 
this is not the case in Germany.  This difference may reflect the greater tendency for product customi-
sation and specialisation in Germany.  Customisation and complex installation procedures each 
strongly act against the use of distributors in both countries.  Interestingly, high product maintenance 
demands increased the likelihood of UK firms delegating this role to distributors but encouraged Ger-
man firms to export directly. 
Higher R&D intensity, which is a firm based measure, was associated with exporting directly.  A plau-
sible logic is that the more technologically sophisticated products require direct contact between users 
and manufacturers in order to ensure their effective utilisation.  However, in practice, higher levels of 
product innovativeness were associated with using distributors - the opposite outcome to that which 
was expected.  It may be that the level of product novelty obligated the manufacturers to sell via a dis-
tributor.  Customers may not have been prepared to adopt and purchase highly innovative, and thus 
risky, designs without the direct involvement and commitment of an established and experienced dis-
tributor. 
Arguably, the persons who are most able to persuade industrial customers that using a distributor is 
unnecessary are the senior managers of the NTBF.  This could help explain the finding that the more a 
firm’s managers have living or work experience abroad, the more likely the firm is to export directly.  
The key fact here may be the authority or credibility of these senior managers with foreign customers.  
(The exact impact of the type of managerial experience differed between the UK and Germany al-
though the general influence was in the same direction.).  While senior management experience 
changed the firm’s behaviour, the experience of the firm itself, as measured in the duration from first 
to present international sales, did not significantly influence the mode selected.  This finding directly 
contradicts the logic of stage or process based models of internationalisation.  However, caution is 
necessary given the limited duration of the observation period (usually less than six years) of the inter-
national activities of the respondent firms. The concept of advanced planning is often inappropriate in 
understanding the generic behaviour of either SMEs or NTBFs.  Formalised planning is often a large 
firm practice.  For the smaller firm, planning is often substituted by intuition and a reliance on a high 
level of operational flexibility.  However, the strongest finding of the models attempting to predict the 
mode used was that respondents who include international sales in their ex ante business plans were 
very significantly more likely to use distributors.  This finding was the same for both UK and German 
firms. 
The inclusion of country specific factors did not produce consistent results between Germany and the 
UK.  There was a tendency for UK companies to use distributors in large, target country markets irre-
spective of the latter’s level of economic development.  For German respondent firms, the absolute 
size of the market appeared not to be important.  However, distributors were more likely to be used if 
the target market was economically developed.  There was no conclusive evidence that firms in either 
Germany or the UK had a favoured channel strategy in order to enter any particular country or region. 
2.9 Firm Performance and Internationalisation 
It has been implicit in the entirety of this report, that international activity is an economically desirable 
activity.  This means that young, high tech firms undertaking international sales are deemed to be 
more likely to increase the economic value of their businesses and/or they are likely to create more 
employment.  These positive outcomes of NTBF activity are not only of interest to the firms’ owners 
and employees.  Government and an increasing body of private and institutional investors have a di-
rect interest in the performance of high tech, young firms. 
Labour Productivity 
Labour productivity is widely use in micro-studies as one measure of firm performance. Our approach 
is embedded in the tradition of various micro-econometric studies which attempt to assess the effect of 
R&D on firm performance (see surveys by Griliches 1994, Mairesse and Sassenou 1991, Harhoff 
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1995).  We employed the standard approach well known from these studies which was subsequently 
augmented by various factors to capture the impact of internationalisation on productivity. This stan-
dard approach at the micro-level is to assume that the relationship between a firm’s output (sales) and 
inputs (capital, labour etc.) can be characterised by the well-known Cobb-Douglas function which re-
lates factor inputs to firms output in a additive logarithmic specification.  For estimation purposes, re-
searchers usually transform and adapt this basic equation.  Also, usually some additional controls are 
added and some further restriction imposed on the data.  
One of the major motives hypothesised for firms entering international markets is related to the resul-
tant ability to spread initial fixed costs across a larger output in order to realise economies of scale.  
Furthermore, some firms also indicated that they expect some positive effects from establishing close 
contacts with leading corporate users of their products or services.  If these effects occur, they both 
should lead to higher factor productivity from firms with international business activities.  
Besides some problems on constructing the capital stock the model incurs a number of endogenity 
problems. These problems are solved by operationalising the internationalisation dummy, the venture 
capital dummy and the presence of public grants using their expected values  These values are gener-
ated from the Probit-regressions (see Table D-8). This has to be taken into account when interpreting 
the regression coefficient given in Table D-8. 
The results of estimations indicate that the non-R&D labour productivity of firms which have interna-
tionalised was some 40-50% higher than domestic market only firms.  Measured in additional, annual 
sales per employee, these productivity gains represent a marginal revenue of ECU 50-60,000.  These 
benefits are likely to reflect the firms’ abilities to realise economies of scale when no longer con-
strained by the limitations of their domestic markets.  Similarly, the involvement of venture capital fi-
nance at start-up also increases the productivity of non R&D labour by an estimated ECU 30,000 per 
year.  By whatever means, the involvement of venture capital finance allowed these nascent firms to 
exploit their potential more rapidly than in the absence of this source of finance.  The positive effect of 
venture capital is in contrast to the negative, albeit insignificant, effect on labour productivity of re-
ceiving public grant finance.  This suggests that the benefit of venture capital is not merely as an addi-
tional source of finance but is, in part, a consequence of the ‘capital and consulting’ package of bene-
fits provided by these professional equity investors (MacMillan et al 1989, Sapienza 1992). 
The results of the model also indicated a significantly higher factor productivity in Germany than in 
the UK.  These estimates were much higher than expected.  However, the model is measuring non-
R&D labour productivity and the unusually high country differences would have been less if total la-
bour productivities could have been used.  R&D intensity also had a material effect on productivity.  
This would be expected given the sampled population was exclusively made up of NTBFs. 
Sales and Employment Growth  
The ‘average yearly growth rates’ of both sales revenue and employment numbers was measured for 
the period from firm start-up until the time of the survey - an average period of approximately five 
years.  What is immediately evident is the near ‘normality’ of the growth distributions both of which 
assume the classic, bell-shaped curve (albeit with a noticeable right tail reflecting a small number of 
high growth outliers).  For surviving firms, the annual growth rates spanned 25-35% for sales revenues 
and 17-25% for employment.  These are substantial and impressive performance figures.  Closer 
analysis indicates that a bias exists towards UK firms at the higher levels of growth.  For example, in 
employment terms, 15% of UK firms recorded a greater than 50% annual growth rate compared with 
only 13% of German firms.  At 100% employment growth rates, the corresponding figures were 3.4% 
UK and 2.4% German firms.  Thus, there is a tendency for high performance ‘outliers’ (cf. Storey’s 
“Ten Percenters”) to be British rather than German firms.  However, the survey was conducted during 
a period when the German economy had recently experienced peculiarly severe economic pressures 
due to reunification and the largest economic downturn since World War II.  Thus, national compari-
sons at the margin should be treated with some caution. 
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A central question of the study is ‘does international sales activity enhance firm growth?’  Accord-
ingly, sales and employment regression estimates (see Table D-8) were made.  They indicate an elas-
ticity of sales growth rate from internationalisation of 13%.  That is, a doubling of international sales 
would increase mean growth rates from 25 to 38% per annum.  However, no similar, significant effect 
could be found for the impact of internationalisation on employment levels.  This could suggest that 
entrepreneurs preferentially used internationalisation to generate sales, rather than additional jobs.  
This logic supports the finding that NTBFs frequently use agents for international activities.  The for-
mer activity directly increases the value of the company and thus their personal wealth., Internationali-
sation help firms to exploit economies of scale.  However, caution is again necessary as a large share 
of the additional sales and employment generation witnessed in this study is because of the excep-
tional performance of a small number of ‘fast track’ companies.  
The regressions of average yearly growth rates produced a number of other interesting findings.  
While industry effects did not appear to influence growth rates, there was a strong negative effect of 
‘initial firm size’.  This supported the hypothesis that there is a minimum efficient scale and that firms 
below this threshold pay the price in reduced sales and employment growth.  Similarly, the results 
showed a negative effect for age.  The older the firms, the more likely that growth rates, particularly 
sales, will decline.  Conversely, the larger the start-up’s founder team and the existence of a permanent 
commitment to R&D both increased growth rates (although R&D only affected sales performance.).   
The dynamic of technology markets is illustrated in the effect of the ‘windows of opportunity’, i.e. the 
time period after product launch and before the firm experiences serious competition.  A short window 
of opportunity of less than one year is positively associated with more rapid sales and employment 
growth.  A longer window of opportunity is more likely to be associated with depressed employment 
growth.  These findings would suggest that highly contested markets oblige firms to exploit their com-
parative (but eroding) advantages as vigorously as possible.  This ‘product life cycle logic’ is sup-
ported by the finding that the age of the product is negatively associated with sales growth rates.   
Arguably a more perverse finding, given the debate on the financial constraints faced by young 
NTBFs, was the lack of a statistically significant effect of either venture capital or public grant provi-
sion on both measures of firm growth in the combined Anglo-German sample (as opposed to factor 
productivity).  However, the British sample shows a more significant, and positive, impact for venture 
capital investment than the German sample.  The absence of a significant effect for venture capital fi-
nance across the combined sample can be partly attribute to the fact that we also include some strate-
Figure 13:  
Estimated Distribution of Sales and Employment Growth of High-tech Start-ups by Country 
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gic variables in our models which are likely influenced by the presence of venture capital in a firm.  
Therefore, these variables already capture part of the venture capital effect.  What we can conclude 
from our research is that the impact on venture capital finance is stronger in the British case and that 
the advice aspect of the VC presence is at least as important to a start-up as relaxing the liquidity con-
straint via the provision of equity finance.  
The analysis of performance was extended by looking at those variables which differentiated between 
firms becoming fast or slow growth businesses (see Table D-8).  The top and bottom deciles were used 
to set the boundaries of performance.  This analysis was undertaken because it is important to recog-
nise that these two groups within the last ten percent of a distribution represent both the largest job 
gains but also the largest job losses in the sample.  Interestingly, the multinomial logit model was 
more productive in explaining fast versus slow employment growth rather than sales performance.  
Thus, an important finding was that extremely high rates of sales growth are a consequent of random 
shocks rather than robust associations with known variables.  As with most things in life, it pays to be 
lucky. 
This analysis confirmed that the German sampled firms are more likely than the British firms to grow 
moderately.  This moderation extends to both sides of the mean.  German firms are more likely to 
cluster near the central values for both sales and employment growth.  This is particularly true for 
sales growth rates. Again, age reduced the chance of being a fast growth firm.  The importance of hav-
ing multiple (three or more) founders for fast sales growth was reinforced.  The commitment to per-
manent R&D supported the fast growth of sales revenues and also lessened the likelihood of slow em-
ployment growth. 
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3 Results from the British and German Case Studies – The 
Qualitative Research Dimension 
3.1 Case Study Analysis: Method and Process 
The selection process led to 40 new technology based firms being interviewed during the Summer of 
1998 in both Germany and the UK.  Underpinning the chosen methodology, the purpose of the inter-
views was four-fold:  
1. to corroborate the firm-specific data given in the mail questionnaire survey  
2. to develop a better understanding of the nature and logic of internationalisation activity as per-
ceived by the practitioner managers 
3. to learn more about the background of the companies and their future plans in order to set the in-
ternationalisation decision within a strategic context 
4. to search for possible patterns in the data from the matched samples 
The case study interviews were not necessary in order to complete the findings of the quantitative 
analyses of the project.  However, they were considered imperative to ensure the researchers appreci-
ated, if not fully understood, the detail and richness of the firms’ decision processes.  The opportunity 
to establish a dialogue with founders and senior management was therefore constructed as an intrinsic 
part of the research agenda.  This was deemed particularly important given that a number of the re-
search findings may have relevance for prescriptive and policy-oriented, decision making.   
Postal questionnaires cannot provide all the answers because this methodology has a number of seri-
ous limitations.  In order to study more deeply the motivational basis of the companies’ innovation and 
internationalisation behaviour, qualitative analysis offers a critical complement to survey questions.  
Personal interviews also allow survey information to be corroborated thereby increasing the latter’s 
credibility.  For example, written questionnaires are commonly designed to be answered by a founder 
or, at least, a senior and highly informed member of the management team.  However, in practice, they 
are not necessarily completed by the founder or other key staff but are often delegated to subordinate 
staff.  They, in turn, may not have the level of information or understanding required in order to an-
swer accurately important questions.  Qualitative queries on historic motivations or attitudes can be 
especially difficult when sought by remote and, largely uncontrollable, research instruments.   
For the above reasons, we decided to undertake a series of individual case studies in both Germany 
and the UK. Continuing the matched sample methodology, the case studies included representatives of 
firms which had and had not internationalised. The former were categorised for analysis into Born-
international and Late-internationalisers. It is important to stress that the findings from the quantitative 
results presented above in this research are in no small part a product of the insights gained from the 
forty British and German case studies.  The founder managers of these high tech young companies 
gave the researchers a perspective and understanding which could not be obtained purely through the 
more remote vehicle of postal survey questionnaires.  While the peculiar and specific observations of 
these forty respondents cannot be easily generalised, the researchers were impressed at the level of 
correspondence between the survey findings and the case study experiences.  Observations are made 
which, it is hoped, add meaning and relevance to the statistical generalisations already described.  
However, these case study observations should not be taken as statistically validated findings.  Rather, 
they represent possible opportunities for a greater comprehension of the data.  
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3.2 Timing of International Market Entry 
The sixteen interviewed, born-international firms exhibited a very strong commitment to an interna-
tional focus.  This was pursued to the extent that some managers acknowledged that they had not paid 
sufficient attention to their home market.  Ten of the sixteen firms traded in more than ten foreign 
markets.  Importantly, the products of these born-international firms generally did not require exten-
sive, customer-specific sales effort.  Limited product customisation had assisted internationalisation.  
While the firms’ products embraced innovative technologies, the employed technology was not so 
novel as to require complex and demanding installation or maintenance.  Their increasing product 
ranges could be successfully sold and subsequently supported by intermediaries.  This intrinsic func-
tionality was an indication of the planning and managerial thought that had gone into the products 
prior to launch.  This ‘managerialism’ was also supported by the finding that, with very few excep-
tions, the founders of born-international firms had extensive, international management experience. 
One difference between UK and German born-international firms was that the latter tended to forge 
and maintain strong and close associations with a small number of large German industrial customers.  
A similar dependency of British born-international firms on a small number of large, UK customers 
was much less common.  This may be in part because of an industrial structure in the UK with fewer 
large manufacturing firms existing than in the German economy.  Generally, a strong attention on the 
home market and close relations to key domestic customers was a model of much greater relevance to 
German respondent firms.  When these German firms internationalised, they frequently did so by sell-
ing to a foreign branch office or subsidiary of their traditional, domestic customers.  This practice was 
nicely described by one German co-author as “internationalisation by convoy”.  It is a behaviour not 
generally adopted by British firms which remained more separate and less integrated with their larger 
customers. 
Late-internationalisers should not be seen as necessarily less successful than their born-international 
counterparts.  For some firms, the circumstances of their start-up precluded international sales.  Some-
times the product was still in a quasi-development stage.  In the case of one firm with medically re-
lated products, regulatory approval had not yet been obtained.  These situations sometimes allowed lo-
cal sales but not international activity.  For other firms, the domestic market was highly attractive and 
there was little immediate pressure to seek foreign customers.  Indeed, some late-internationalisers ex-
hibited the fastest sales growth rates within the total sample.  Successful late-internationalisers em-
barked on internationalisation for strategic reasons recognising that eventually their domestic advan-
tage would erode as markets became more competitive and mature.  Given the resources accumulated 
by these successful firms, they could embark on international sales using high commitment modes - as 
indeed two UK firms did.  Given the primary importance that German firms particularly gave to their 
domestic market, late-internationalisers reflected a less global, and possibly more pragmatic, perspec-
tive than their born-international colleagues.  They tended to sell to fewer foreign markets than the 
more quickly internationalising firms.  Interestingly, late-internationalisers appeared to be started by 
entrepreneurs with less managerial experience than the born-international firms.  However, the suc-
cessful firms rapidly introduced a management culture into their growing businesses to accommodate 
the pressures of international growth. 
The differences between an internationalising and a non-internationalising firm may ultimately be a 
function of time.  Six of the seven non-internationalisers interviewed were currently considering inter-
national sales. For example, one non-international firm has, since being interviewed, signed a global 
licensing deal with one of the largest digital printing hardware manufacturers in the world.  Within 
two years it has created four overseas sales offices.  Only one firm thought that their product could not 
be sold outside their domestic market without incurring unacceptably high, transaction costs.  This 
software product in the medical data management market exhibited very high asset specificity.  Like 
late-internationalisers, non-internationalisers did not feel a commercial imperative to rapidly interna-
tionalise beyond domestic markets.  They also shared a common characteristic that a number of the 
founders had little direct managerial experience.  The effect of this was that several non-international 
firms noted that internationalisation would require new management skills.  In the absence of such 
skills, the management believed that to embark on a process of internationalisation would seriously 
over-stretch the company. 
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It may well be that all the companies can best be differentiated by their relative positioning on a sig-
moid ‘firm development curve’.  The degree of their internationalisation activities may be primarily 
dependent on elapsed time. The results of the hazard function analysis noted earlier would broadly 
support this contention.  However, the case studies indicated that attitudinal and market variables did 
play some role.  Certainly, the born-international managers expressed considerably stronger commit-
ment to foreign sales.  Also, they tended to operate in technology markets which, if described as 
niches, were international niches.  Both late and non-internationalisers appeared less managerial than 
born-international managers.  Their domestic markets often produced highly satisfactory revenues.  
However, for some and probably the majority of firms, there were signs that this domestic market suf-
ficiency would not last indefinitely. 
3.3 Fast Growing versus Slow Growing Firms 
The differences between fast and slow growing companies were less equivocal.  It was more legiti-
mate to characterise an archetype Fast Growth Firm from the forty case studies.  Such a firm was al-
most invariably founded and run by a small team of well-educated executives sharing considerable 
professional and management experience gained both from the home and international markets.  The 
market opportunities targeted by the fast growth firms were large and expanding.  Demand was not re-
stricted to one country market alone.  The transaction costs of reaching foreign markets existed but 
were not insuperable.  This was in part because the firms did not normally sell highly customised or 
individualised products.  The products on offer were often part of a related family rather than a single, 
one-off product.  They incorporated innovative technology but rarely leading-edge science.  Not being 
too in advance of contemporary user experience ensured both their acceptance and adoption by fre-
quently large, industrial customers anxious for product security and reliability as well as added unique 
functionality.  There was some evidence that the German fast growth firms emphasised the nature of 
their technologies more than their UK counterparts.   
Of considerable interest was the fact that none of the UK fast growth companies had registered for le-
gal protection of their intellectual property.  In contrast, all but one of the German firms had taken out 
patent or copyright protection on their technological innovations.  The UK firms justified their posi-
tion by citing what they viewed as the excessive disclosure that the IPR registration process requires.  
The fast growing firms in the case study samples used both distributors and direct sales modes.  How-
ever, there was some evidence that the fastest growth firms tended to sell directly. 
Just as a fast growth NTBFs can be characterised generically, so too can Low Growth Firms be simi-
larly defined.  The two types of firm are broadly opposites.  Low growth firms typically service small, 
niche markets.  Without exception, all of these firms were supplying markets which the entrepreneurs 
did not believe would continue to meet their commercial objectives in the longer term.  Very often, 
these markets were mature and already supplied by several competing firms.  High value-added, high 
margin strategies were not appropriate or feasible for such markets which were usually highly price 
sensitive.  Perhaps counter-intuitively, several of the low growth firms had attempted to international-
ise often early in their life cycle.  However, early internationalisation was possibly more a reflection of 
the limitations of the home market rather than a consequence of a pro-active, internationalisation 
ethos.  Generally, their efforts had been marred by problems of insufficient resource commitment and 
weak execution.  Although some foreign sales were achieved, strong reciprocal relationships with for-
eign distributor partners were rarely engendered.  The mode of internationalisation selected was al-
most exclusively via distributors for the UK firms although German low growth firms were as likely to 
export directly.  Overall, relationships with foreign distributors were remote and generally disappoint-
ing.  This again may be a consequence of the noticeably less managerial experience and professional 
training of the founders.  Negligible management training should not be equated with poor educational 
levels.  On the contrary, the level of education of low growth company founders was uniformly high.  
However, this training was restricted to technological rather than to commercial aspects of their enter-
prise. 
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3.4 Formal and Informal Sources of Venture Capital 
The case study firms were specifically chosen to reflect characteristics of interest including sources of 
finance.  Thus, ten UK and six German companies each having received equity from an external inves-
tor were selected.  In the case of the UK case studies, the ten firms had received formal venture capi-
tal.  Six of these UK firms had also attracted business angel or informal venture capital finance.  Four 
German firms had accepted venture capital and a further two firms had business angel finance.  These 
statistics purposely do not mirror the survey sample where less than 10% of all respondents had at-
tracted external investors of any kind. 
The investment selection preferences of venture capitalists were clearly evident.  Virtually all exter-
nally financed firms had been founded by management teams rather than by individuals.  The firms 
were pursuing growth strategies which were multi-country in focus although they continued to adopt 
resource extensive marketing plans.  It appeared that the business models of the recipient firms were 
designed in part to attract the attention and interest of professional equity providers.  Young firms ap-
peared to have become more informed or better advised on the selection criteria of professional inves-
tors and were behaving accordingly. 
The advice available to the young firms from their venture capitalists was generally centred on finan-
cial reviews and strategic plans.  The financiers almost never made any detailed contribution to techni-
cal or market related issues.  A certain ambivalence to the value and role of the venture capitalist was 
expressed by several of the respondents.  The provision of finance was seen as their primary and 
sometimes only valued role.  Concern with the potential legal authority of the venture capitalist over 
the investee firm’s assets in times of difficult firm performance was a particular cause for concern.  
German entrepreneurs were especially against an external financier being able to prejudice the entre-
preneurs’ ownership or control of the businesses that they had founded.  Yet, generally, German re-
spondents were more respectful of venture capital firms and their potential role than the British firms.  
This is perhaps a worrying finding given that venture capital is much more available in the UK.   Brit-
ish firms are more likely to have greater information and/or first hand experience of contact with eq-
uity investors than their German peers.  Interestingly, it was the managers of firms which had actually 
used venture capital, rather than those with ‘hear-say’ experience, who were most positive about the 
benefits of an external ‘partner’. 
The advice available from business angels was generally held in greater regard by the entrepreneurial 
managers.  This is not unexpected as a business angel is very often a successful ‘entrepreneur turned 
investor’.  Given that they tend to invest in commercial areas where they have direct and detailed ex-
perience, their ability to add value is more immediately obvious to the entrepreneur or manager.  De-
spite the skills, experience and considerable levels of finance of the venture capitalist, the impression 
is given that many founder managers are happier with the (supposedly) potentially less threatening re-
lationship with an informal investor. 
Although venture capitalists were on occasion prepared to back bold business models, the respondents 
frequently gave the impressions of having dealt with professional investors with relatively short term, 
investment horizons and little appetite for the necessary risks and uncertainties of early-stage technol-
ogy investment.  A small number of investee firms suggested that the short term and ‘selfish’ interests 
of the financier could sometimes threaten the financial security of the investee firm.  Only one respon-
dent had obtained seed capital from a venture capital investor.  Perhaps alarmingly, three highly suc-
cessful internationalisers observed that their venture capitalists had each been extremely reluctant to 
support initially the firm’s internationalisation plans.  However, it should be noted that external inves-
tors and their trustees have a fiduciary duty to manage their funds prudently.  Such responsibilities are 
occasionally likely to conflict with the exaggerated expectations and optimism of some investee firms.  
As such, venture capitalists are an easy target for criticism irrespective of the value of their economic 
contribution.  It is noteworthy that the British entrepreneurs with direct experience of private equity 
were generally more positive about venture capitalists than the German owners of young high tech 
businesses.  The UK has the largest and most developed venture capital industry in Europe.  Accord-
ingly, British entrepreneurs have had much longer to reflect more objectively on the pros and cons of 
this form of finance. 
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3.5 Small Business Grants from the Public Sector 
Grants represent an alternative or complementary form of finance to young firms.  However, in reality, 
given the modest size of most public sector transfers to small business, this form of finance is rarely a 
substitute for commercial funding.  The forty case study firms could be segregated into three separate 
categories given the entrepreneur’s attitude and response to public support measures for new enter-
prises: 
1. Successful firms which actively sought multiple grants and presented a professional and in-
formed attitude towards acquiring public sector support  
2. Successful firms which did not apply for public grants seeing them as inappropriately time 
consuming and inflexible for rapidly growing businesses 
3. A majority of firms which were generally poorly informed about the available resources from 
public support schemes and whose applications, when made, were often relatively unprofes-
sional.  These firms were less likely to be successful at gaining state assistance than Group 1 
but are likely to comprise the majority of grant applicants. 
The first group are highly efficient seekers of public subsidy particularly for the early, critically re-
source constrained, stages of a young enterprise.  They also meet the needs of grant providers anxious 
for credible and successful grant applicants in order to demonstrate the relevance and effectiveness of 
their grant programmes.  This group’s professionalism also makes them attractive to venture capital 
firms.  Two-thirds of the venture capital financed firms had also received public grants - usually prior 
to negotiating external equity.  The second group is often as commercially shrewd as the first group.  
However, they see the opportunity costs of applying for grants as unacceptably high.  The primary cost 
is the time necessary to prepare for and complete a full application form.  This can be a substantial in-
formation collection exercise requiring the assistance of a consultant and/or an accountant depending 
on the size of the grant claim and the complexity of the grant scheme.  With limited managerial re-
sources and demanding commercial goals, this second group did not see the net advantage of public 
grants.  Indeed, these respondents are commonly quite hostile as they perceive public funds being 
awarded to either those who often do not need the grant (i.e. Group 1) or those that should not be en-
couraged as they are, in their opinion, economically marginal (i.e. Group 3).  This third group which is 
numerically the largest community is most in need of public grants.  However, their limited profes-
sionalism is such that they are the least likely recipients (in terms of the percentage of successful ap-
plications).  They are usually poorly informed about the availability and appropriateness of extant 
grant instruments. 
There is almost universal criticism of the complexity and time consuming nature of public grant appli-
cations among the potential claimants for such grants.  Arguably, a more serious criticism is the in-
flexibility of grant schemes to the particular needs of target firms deemed suitable for support.  The 
distribution of information available on grant schemes is also highly skewed.  This is particularly the 
case for European Commission grants as opposed to national grant schemes.  The former schemes also 
commonly require co-operating partners in two or more countries.  The organisational demands of ar-
ranging such trans-national, intra-Community co-operation can be a very serious, and thus highly un-
desirable, time burden on a newly formed or young high tech firm.  Only three firms among our forty 
case studies had received grants from any source which could be broadly described as relating to in-
ternationalisation activities. 
Overall, the impression was gained that public sector grant schemes did not appear to impact signifi-
cantly on the fortunes of the respondent firms with regard to the initiation or development of interna-
tional activities.  Grants may have helped internationalising firms but there is no evidence that the 
available grants encouraged internationalisation.  However, grants can have a positive role and effect, 
particularly for (the majority of) NTBFs which have been started with insufficient finances.  Grants 
can also encourage the adoption of good practices by the entrepreneurial manager applicants.  The 
very act of having to present formally documented evidence of future plans, market analyses and out-
line cash flows obliges the applicants to think beyond narrow operational horizons.  Yet, there appear 
few assistance programmes specifically designed to help founder managers and their young enterprises 
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to target and gain experience of potential foreign markets.  UK firms cited that the most immediate 
‘trigger’ for international sales was a visit to an overseas trade show.  One German firm alone in our 
forty strong case study sample was specifically grant aided to visit a trade show.  However, from the 
evidence of these case studies, such funding was not common (or perhaps not known to the entrepre-
neurs).  There appears to be some merit in exploring the potential demand for a small but flexible 
overseas travel/accommodation grant for NTBFs which would be awarded rapidly and with little bu-
reaucracy to eligible applicants12. 
3.6 Differences between German and UK New Technology Based 
Firms 
What has been well corroborated by this research is just how few are the important differences be-
tween German and UK high tech start-up and young firms.  Country based differences certainly do ex-
ist in firm characteristics and behaviour but they tend to be at the margin.  In many respects, the distri-
bution of the descriptive variables of the firms in our survey would suggest that the respondents came 
from the same underlying population regardless of their nationality.  However, there are a number of 
important differences between the German and British sample firms.  At the risk of propounding crude 
stereotypes, there appear to be specific characteristics which can be described as typically German or 
typically British.  These differences may be usefully interpreted and illustrated in the differing atti-
tudes of the managers to risk and to uncertainty. 
German new enterprises tend to start with a larger number of founder employees than their British 
counterparts.  A significantly larger proportion of German start-ups is in the software sector, arguably 
the least resource intensive of the five sector classifications selected.  At the time of formation, there is 
a marginally greater probability that the UK teams will have had prior experience of working with 
each other.  UK managers are also more likely to have worked abroad or had previous work experi-
ence with an international firm.  Somewhat less German firms undertake R&D.  However, those firms 
which do undertake R&D invest a greater proportion of their total sales into this activity than the Brit-
ish firms.  None the less, German firms are less likely to undertake permanent rather than occasional 
R&D activities compared to British firms. 
Shortages of skills affect both German and British firms.  German firms are more likely to record 
shortages at start-up in the business skills of finance, sales and marketing.  However, the German 
firms have a better record of correcting these shortcomings over time than their UK counterparts.  
British firms are particularly weak in addressing chronic R&D staff scarcities.  This finding appears 
perhaps contradictory as UK firms are overall more likely to use technology developed internally 
rather than by third parties. This is especially the case for the smallest size category of firm.  
German firms are more likely to sell capital goods or products to end-users.  Their products are also 
likely to be more customised and to require greater individual effort, in order to install and to train us-
ers, than the products from UK firms.  However, the high level of technology used cannot allow any 
differentiation between domestic and international customers.  Typically, German firms will sell pre-
dominantly to large industrial users initially through domestic contacts.  Over time, the sales relation-
ship will develop into a close, long term, integration of suppliers and customers.  Early internationali-
sation tends to be via the development of sales to foreign client firms owned or controlled by key cus-
tomers in the German domestic market.  The new country markets entered are predominantly Euro-
pean with the exception of the USA.   
UK companies in common with their German counterparts are likely to sell approximately 70% of 
their total exports to other European countries and to the USA.  However, their residual export sales 
are much more likely to be in geographically more remote markets, for example, the Pacific Rim or 
South America.  British companies are much less likely to forge tight relationships and supply custom-
ised products to key, large company customers.  Rather, they are more likely to sell more uniform and 
scaleable product types to a diversity of customers in a diversity of countries.  These export customers 
                                                 
12  Such grants may already exist.  However, if they do, they are unknown to the forty case study representatives 
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in aggregate will be economically more important.  In consequence, over time the home market will 
become less significant to British suppliers than to German firms.  America represents the UK’s larg-
est foreign market.  France is both Germany’s immediate neighbour and it’s largest export market. 
The impression is given from both the survey and the case study findings that German firms prefer to 
contain and diminish the risks and uncertainties endemic to the international sales process.  Selling 
customised products to long term, large, industrial (and ideally German owned) customers both at 
home and in foreign markets is the preferred state.  Trading relationships are not occasional or chance 
but are the result of purposely nurtured ties of mutual benefits and obligation.  Significant effort is put 
into network relationships by German firms and these bonds are expected to last.  One consequence of 
this may be the already noted higher non-R&D labour productivity of German firms.  In contrast, UK 
firms are less likely to elect to go for the certainty or stability of the German structure.  Rather, they 
rely on their international experience and cultural links.  These endowments are coupled with strong 
entrepreneurial skills of sales, distribution and marketing management.  Collectively, they are used by 
the British to seek out and exploit markets on a world-wide basis.   
Given the endemically high rates of change within new technology sectors, particularly in electronic 
software and hardware sectors, it is not yet clear as to whether the longer term, integrated relationships 
of German habit and preference are more productive than the alternative, more opportunistic, British 
predilection for higher rates of firm adaptability.  For example, the typically high levels of integration 
between German suppliers and their large industrial users mean that the relationship is highly efficient 
as a dyad.  Yet, this strong bilateral relationship may severely weakened the young NTBF supplier’s 
abilities and opportunities to search for and exploit other product/market advantages with different 
customers (see Bower and Christensen, 1995).  Using Burgelman and Grove’s (1996) concept of the 
“strategic inflection point”, there may be a time when the young firm should pull back from an in-
creasing integration with one or small number of local partners and seek wider product applicability 
(i.e. less ‘customisation’) and greater scaleability.  It is perhaps indicative, although certainly not con-
clusive, that the fastest growing firms in the survey were almost invariably from the UK.  The case 
studies suggest that these ‘outliers’, which represent about 5% of the total survey sample, are highly 
international.  However, they are more likely to sell overseas directly than through distributors.  They 
are not necessarily ‘born-international’ and frequently exploit initially the opportunities of a large 
home market. 
LBS / ZEW Conclusions 
  57 
4 Conclusions 
4.1 Eighteen Research-Based Lessons for a Would-be Interna-
tional, High Growth, New Technology Based Firm 
As stated in the introduction to this research exercise, one of the ambitions of the researchers and their 
sponsors was to generate relevant, practicable and research-validated advice for high tech young firms.  
Accordingly, the key results of the research analyses have been reduced to a series of eighteen rec-
ommendations or perhaps, more modestly, insightful suggestions.  To some managers, they may not 
appear particularly exciting or novel.  However, in each case, these recommendations are directly as-
sociated with the behaviour of large groups of firms which have demonstrated superior international 
performance in the survey. 
1. Recruit as good a team of founders and professional managers as possible with high levels of 
international experience, preferably gained in working with and for both large and small firms. 
2. Start as large as possible including the size of the founding team and the financial, technical and 
experiential resources available. 
3. Incorporate highly innovative technologies into products and services but not at the cost of com-
promising either usability or reliability for customers. 
4. Select high margin products which are sold to industrial users rather than to end consumers. 
5. Build a portfolio of demanding customers but do not become excessively committed to or inte-
grated into the non-standard needs of a few large customers. 
6. Design a business model that is scaleable in both volume and number of product-markets tar-
geted. 
7. Commit the firm to international sales from Day 1 in both actions and all planning targets. 
8. Be prepared to enter additional new countries rapidly after the first internationalisation activity. 
9. Plan for significant additional costs in developing international sales and marketing activities. 
10. Appraise product markets in terms of long run, aggregate international demand rather than short 
run, domestic demand and growth. 
11. Develop and properly finance a permanent and focused R&D activity. 
12. Avoid ‘deep niche’ products if high growth is a desired goal.  Ensure a range of applications for 
both products and technologies.   
13. Continue to find ways of reducing product adaptation/transaction costs, particularly the instal-
lation and maintenance costs incurred by new customers, distributors or the vendor. 
14. Assess rigorously the ‘pros and cons’ of exporting direct versus distributors, and consider the 
effect of industry sector, target country and technological innovativeness on channel selection.  
15. Manage distributor relationships effectively and fairly recognising the need for continued recip-
rocal investment of time and resource. 
16. Get known quickly and recognise the “liability of alienness”, i.e. larger firms, particularly cus-
tomers, are likely to be very wary of entering into trading relationships with unknown firms 
17. Be prepared for the rapid entry of new competitors into your product/market space. 
18. Consider external finance (venture capital, business angels, grants) and recognise particularly 
the consequential benefits of enhanced factor productivity, reputational (i.e. endorsement) effects 
and the greater access to professional advice for fast growth firms. 
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4.2 Implications of Research Results for Government 
In the context of high-tech industries, the activities of starting-up and internationalisation have been 
shown to be eventually ‘two sides of the same coin’.  Thus, if governments are interested in the pro-
motion of successful NTBFs they also must, necessarily, be interested in encouraging the processes of 
internationalisation.   
The higher the level of heterogeneity between firms, sectors and countries, the more macro-economic 
policies become the more appropriate instruments.  For example, discussions of currency valuations 
and their consequent impact on industry are normally couched in terms of their effects on large com-
panies.  Large firms, both in manufacturing and service industries, are seen as being the nation’s pri-
mary exporters.  However, our results suggest that small and young firms that sell into foreign markets 
will also be materially influenced by these same factors as are larger exporters.  The more the young 
firm has products which are not customised (and are thus likely to be more price sensitive), the more 
adverse currency movements are likely to have an effect on its competitive position.  This may be a 
cause for concern given that we have argued that firms have to go beyond niche and customised sales 
strategies if they are to grow rapidly in overseas markets.  During this product transfer process, a rela-
tively stronger domestic currency has a direct and negative effect on the aggregate demand and, thus, 
the profitability of immature young firms. 
In addition to the classic macro-economic implications of currency valuations, there are three other 
macro factors which are important, albeit not exclusively, to NTBFs.  The research has shown that all 
start-up firms are likely to experience human capital constraints in one form or another.  The issue for 
government is whether or not the extant educational and training infrastructure resolves these prob-
lems effectively over time.  The results would suggest that German firms are located within labour 
market systems which are more able to identify and reduce skill shortages than the systems available 
to their UK counterparts.  Given that young knowledge firms are initially, by definition, little more 
than the disparate and aggregate skills of their employees and founders, the observation that British 
firms find little correction for persistent R&D staff shortages over time is of considerable concern.  
These findings support recent criticisms in the UK of the effectiveness of the vocational training pro-
vided via the public infrastructure. 
The question of the mobility of labour is not only a problem of geography.  It also concerns whether or 
not experienced managers will take on a significant career risk and move from large firms to start-ups 
or young, technology firms.  The research unequivocally shows the advantages to the new firm of the 
founders or early employees having significant experience abroad and/or in large, international trading 
companies.  Here, UK firms appear to be more advantaged than their German peers.  The result of this 
advantage may be ultimately evidenced in the significantly greater proportion of international sales per 
firm in the UK than in Germany over time.  The encouragement of managerial mobility is likely to be 
strongly associated with appropriate reward systems, and the tax treatment of managerial incentives 
including both share options and capital gains.  These research findings reinforce the importance of 
finding a workable solution regarding the current debate on the role of fiscal measures to encourage 
entrepreneurial action and risk taking.  In essence, experienced managers should be encouraged and 
supported to make the leap from large, established corporations to start-up, technology based firms.  
The researchers felt that the UK was at present more entrepreneurial and risk accepting than Germany.  
However, the authors also believe that this situation is clearly changing for the better in Germany and 
will erode the UK’s relative advantage in this area. 
Finally, the capital markets should ideally be a powerful ally to potentially fast track young firms.  If 
US experience is relevant, an established market for venture capital should particularly be an asset in 
any economy wishing to encourage the genesis and growth of NTBFs (see US Senate 1999 and Gill et 
al. 2000 on the USA experience).  Yet, the Anglo-German results are somewhat ambivalent.  Despite 
the major renaissance of technology investing in Europe since 1995, venture capitalists still seem not 
to be heavily involved at the earliest and most speculative levels of enterprise investment.  ‘Seed capi-
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tal’ from formal venture capital companies remains in short supply.  However, the contemporary high 
valuations of nascent and immature e-business stocks has created a rapid influx of speculative money 
to this sector.  There is starting to be additional evidence that the new interest in technology related, e-
business start-ups is also migrating to other technology stocks including life sciences.   
There was no direct and unassailable evidence from the combined sample that the provision of venture 
capital was directly associated with firms that rapidly internationalised and/or grew more quickly than 
other firms.  Approximately nine respondent businesses in every hundred technology based firms in 
our sample had received venture capital finance.  Generally, UK firms were more sensitive to the im-
pact of venture capital finance.  It was found that having a venture capitalist backer had a positive ef-
fect on export activity if the firm had already decided to export.  Yet, its receipt by a firm did not sig-
nificantly increase that firm’s probability of exporting.  Perversely, a number of case study respon-
dents suggested that, on occasions, venture capital executives were less than supportive of their firms’ 
internationalisation ambitions.  However, in the larger and more experienced British venture capital 
market, there is evidence of some positive impact of venture capitalists on the above average success 
of their investee firms in international markets and, hence, on firm growth.  It would appear that the 
benefits of venture capital may be more evident in indirect and subtle benefits such as access to pro-
fessional support and to the investors’ networks rather than just because of the equity funding alone.  
This can be evidenced in the significantly higher productivity of non R&D labour in venture backed 
firms. However, as a source of informed finance, the role of business angels or informal investors is 
broadly viewed in a more positive light by investee firms in the survey.  Business angels are more 
readily seen as being able to offer valuable operational and strategic advice to the NTBF founders and 
their employees.  None the less, it should be noted that experienced recipients of formal venture capi-
tal finance are among their strongest supporters and advocates.  The researchers expect to see an in-
crease in the influence of venture capitalists on the performance of their investee companies over time.  
It is believed that this effect is likely to be greater in Germany given the relatively less mature nature 
of the German private equity market including technology investing compared to the UK. 
As has been noted, there are no negative effects of government grants on the productivity levels of 
their NTBF recipients.  Thus, at least on this measure, government is not financing less attractive pro-
jects than those firms with exclusively private investors’ support.  However, there is a persistent ar-
gument from investee companies that public grant systems are too complex and too inflexible for the 
dynamic environments in which NTBF currently find themselves.  It is suggested that new technology 
based firms face peculiar conditions which are as much a reflection of their technology focus as their 
status as young enterprises.  Pre-commercial funding (seed capital) continues to remain a problem at 
levels above the ‘boot-strapping’ resources of the entrepreneur(s) and his/her family or friends.  All 
SMEs suffer from the costs of obtaining appropriate and timely information.  These information 
asymmetries can be particularly problematic in the knowledge intensive and turbulent industries in 
which NTBFs exist.   
A plausible argument can therefore be made that NTBFs should have a part of their necessary infor-
mation search costs underwritten by the state.  Legitimate expenditures could include, for example, 
visits to foreign trade fairs or undertaking market research on target countries.  In the absence of this 
incentive, there is a danger that many young, high tech firms will remain ill informed and, thus, more 
vulnerable.  The same argument can be extended to the costs incurred in building up the ‘information 
infrastructure’ of the firm including commercial relationships and networks.   Dissenters may well ar-
gue that existing public schemes can accommodate the peculiar needs of NTBFs.  However, the evi-
dence of the survey, particularly reinforced by the case studies, would suggest that this is not the case.  
The level of both information on and usage of public grants and support mechanisms was relatively 
low.  Critics of the case for the state underwriting part of the information costs of NTBFs, make the 
point that ‘information push’ does not work.  They argue persuasively that it is the responsibility of the 
entrepreneur to marshal all necessary resources including information in order to ensure the success of 
the enterprise.  However, if there are information asymmetries which can be shown to result in a sub-
optimal supply or growth of NTBFs, there still remains a technical case for public subsidy.  Further, if 
the state provides grants, it has a consequent responsibility to ensure that a reasonably competent en-
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trepreneur has little difficulty in becoming aware of the existence of such grants and can make an ap-
plication without a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources. 
4.3 Some Brief, Concluding Observations on ‘Theory’ 
While this research has attempted to answer some questions of direct operational relevance to high 
technology entrepreneurs, it has been grounded in an understanding and critique of the relevance of 
those academic models which attempt to comprehend the nature and logic of internationalisation.  The 
questions asked of both the survey and case study respondents therefore have had two roles.  The re-
searchers wished to understand what factors were important to internationalising firms and whether or 
not our current theoretical understanding corresponded with this empirical reality.  Essentially, the 
theories can be divided into behavioural or economic constructs.  In the former category can be in-
cluded internationalisation process models, stage theory models and network models.  Economic mod-
els embrace theories based on transaction costs/internalisation or on the consequences of imperfect 
markets including monopolistic advantage or oligopolistic behaviour. 
A more detailed treatment of internationalisation theories and their relevance to the current research 
may be found in Bürgel (1999) who makes the point that our conceptual knowledge is severely limited 
especially when we address the dual foci of new technology based firms and internationalisation.  For 
the purposes of this summary chapter, it is sufficient to observe and comment that none of the theories 
provided a totally confident or consistent explanation of our empirical findings.  By the same token, 
none of the theories totally lacked credibility.  For example, stage theories, suggesting an evolution of 
behaviour over time as a consequence of accumulated managerial experience, are highly plausible.  
This is despite their criticism by academics for being tautological and excessively prescriptive.  None 
the less, firms generally appear to enter first foreign markets that are most similar to their home market 
first.  They also tend to increase the level of commitment and resources dedicated to international ac-
tivities over time.  These observations would lend support to the behavioural school of thought and es-
pecially the concept of ‘psychic distance’.  However, a not insignificant number of firms entered geo-
graphically and culturally remote markets soon after formation.  Several firms also made resource in-
tensive, foreign market commitments early in their life cycles.  These contrary examples serve to re-
duce the universality of these process or stage models of internationalisation. 
Transaction cost theories, explaining the internalising of cross-border operations where market based 
services would engender unacceptable levels of cost and/or risk, were also less than comprehensive in 
their ability to explain our research findings.  The transaction costs of installation, maintenance and 
training were not important variables in determining the decision to, or the degree of, international ac-
tivity.  Only product customisation, which required significant commitment of technology resources, 
appeared as a major barrier to internationalisation.  Indeed, the higher the level of R&D expenditure, 
the more likely a firm would use an intermediary to conduct international activities.  Transaction cost 
theory would suggest that greater investment in research would lead to greater asset specificity which 
in turn would lead to the internalisation of the activity in order to manage the consequent monitoring 
costs.  The evidence is highly ambivalent.  NTBFs appeared to accept rather than avoid transaction 
costs - in part because they often have little real choice.  
The correspondence of theory and practice was most evident when appraising the empirical findings 
through the lens of the ‘resource based theory of the firm’ or the related ‘organisational capabilities’ 
perspective.  These constructs with their focus on the economic nature of competitive assets (both tan-
gible and tacit) are successors to the economic models of imperfect competition.  The research hy-
potheses which concentrated on imperfectly imitable, firm specific factors received support.  Thus, the 
previous international experience of the founder managers and the technological innovativeness of the 
firm’s products each had a significant effect on the processes of internationalisation including the se-
lected mode of internationalisation.  For example, the more the experience of management in foreign 
markets, the more likely the firm will export directly.  However, the greater the innovativeness of the 
technology employed in the firm’s products, the more likely that a sales intermediary will be used.   
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Perhaps one of the most interesting insights was from this last observation that firms elected to use in-
termediaries to sell technologically innovative products.  The use of a third party would appear sub-
optimal given that economic rents have to be shared and there are additional monitoring or governance 
costs.  Yet, none of the internationalisation theories consider organisational legitimacy.  It is assumed 
that customers will use the best technological solution irrespective of the nature of the provider.  The 
reality is very different.  Small high tech firms with little history or market presence are likely to be 
ignored by larger firms as representing too great a source of uncertainty.  In order for the NTBF to 
make a sale, it may have to purchase credibility by seeking to be accepted by an intermediary its end 
customer will recognise, e.g. an internationally known, value-added reseller (VAR).  Thus, the use of a 
distributor or agent may be economically sub-optimal but may also remain the only viable option, at 
least initially, in order to sell to large industrial users.  The intermediary is used to overcome what we 
have termed “the liability of alienness”.  This concept takes the theory materially nearer reality as it is 
experienced by the technologically innovative young firm. 
4.4 …and finally: Areas for Future Research 
This study has involved a team of academic researchers in both Germany and the UK and has encom-
passed a range of related disciplines from Economics and Management Studies.  A highly refined 
methodology including both postal survey and case study interview instruments has been developed, 
tested and employed in two major European economies.  There is obvious value in extending this 
work to other European and non-European centres.  For example, Germany and the UK are both 
northern European nations with strong cultural and economic similarities.  The situation and interna-
tional behaviour of NTBFs in the southern European countries of France, Spain or Italy may be sig-
nificantly different.  Yet, each of these cited countries has a substantial domestic market.  This is not 
the situation facing the new technology, small firm sectors in, for example, Belgium, Israel or Austra-
lia.  Our knowledge in the West of the contemporary circumstances facing NTBFs in the export ori-
ented economies of South Korea, Taiwan or Japan is even more parlous. 
The domain of technology based, international entrepreneurs is poorly developed as a research focus 
with the exception of the valuable contributions of a few scholars.  The depth of knowledge and con-
tacts made in the present study could, and should, be cultivated to allow eventually a longitudinal per-
spective and analysis.  How do our 500 plus British and German young companies develop over time?  
Will any evolve into world class, technology companies able to compete with American or Asian ex-
emplars?  Can we help address the policy question of why so few European technology firms attain in-
ternational dominance?  In part, the future success of NTBFs might be conditional on their ability to 
flourish within the more dispersed and intangible, networked linkages available to technologically so-
phisticated firms.  When, where and how do these firms collaborate or compete?  What options are 
available, and successful, to ambitious firms with high levels of tacit knowledge but few tangible as-
sets particularly in relation to existing market incumbents?  What value over time do outside sources 
of finance and advice really provide?  Each of these questions invariably will need further elaboration 
when both country and sector/technology specific dimensions are added.   
Internationally focused, new technology based firms are a fruitful subject for further study and analy-
sis.  They represent a source of current and future value to society that no developed economy can af-
ford not to recognise or to nurture.  We hope that our present study has helped to move these high tech 
entrepreneurs more to centre stage - a position that they most assuredly deserve. 
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Appendix A Definition of ‘High-Tech’ Industries 
Table A-1:  
Definition of ‘High-Tech’ Industries 
Aggregated indus-
tries used 
NACE Rev. 1 Short description according to NACE Rev.1 
R&D intensive 
service industries  
64.20; 72.20; 
72.30; 72.40; 
72.60; 73.10 
Telecommunication, Computer Programming and Software Services, Data 
Processing, Misc. Computer Services, R&D in Natural Sciences and Engi-
neering 
ICT-Hardware 30.01; 30.02; 
32.20; 32.30 
Office Equipment; Computers and other Information Processing Equipment; 
Television and Radio Transmitters and Apparatus for Line Telephony and 
Line Telegraphy; Television and Radio Receivers, Sound or Video Re-
cording and Reproducing Apparatus 
Engineering In-
dustries 
33.20; 33.30; 
33.40 
Electronic Instruments and Appliances for Measuring, Checking (except In-
dustrial Process Control); Electronic Industrial Process Control Equipment; 
Optical Instruments; Photographic Equipment 
Health and Life 
Sciences 
24.41; 24.42; 
33.10 
Pharmaceutical Products and Preparations; Medical and Surgical Equipment 
and Orthopaedic Appliances 
Misc. High-Tech 
manufacturing 
24.16; 24.17; 
31.10; 31.20; 
32.10; 35.30 
Plastics and Synthetic Rubber in Primary Form; Electric Motors, Generators 
and Transformers; Electricity Distribution and Control Apparatus; Electronic 
Valves, Tubes and other Components; Aircraft and Speedcraft Manufactur-
ing 
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Appendix B The Questionnaire (UK) 
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Appendix C Summary Descriptive Statistics 
Table C-1:  
Summary Descriptive Statistics 
 UK Germany UK Germany 
  Raw Data Raw Data Weighted Data Weighted Data 
        
Variable Mean/ 
Share 
Std. Dev, Mean/ 
Share 
Std. Dev, Mean/ 
Share 
Std. Dev, Mean/ 
Share 
Std. Dev,
West German Firm   0.66    0.75   
East German Firm   0.34    0.25   
ICT-Hardware 0.21  0.18  0.18  0.11   
Engineering 0.17  0.13  0.14  0.07   
Bio/Med/Life 0.09  0.08  0.07  0.05   
Other Industries 0.26  0.31  0.22  0.18   
International Sales 0.71  0.63  0.63  0.56   
Employment at start-up 4.47 6.72 5.88 8.39 3.98 5.89 4.65 6.13
Employment 1998 20.17 23.70 18.85 21.17 16.3 21.38 15.22 18.40
Age of the Firm (1999) 7.08 2.42 6.49 2.21 6.8 2.44 6.08 2.19
Venture Capital Backed 0.11  0.09  0.1  0.09   
Public Grants Recipient 0.18  0.27  0.14  0.2   
Work experience abroad 0.53  0.31  0.52  0.31   
Work experience in MNC 0.51  0.35  0.48  0.35   
Education abroad 0.13  0.15  0.13  0.15   
Number of Founders:         
  - 2-3 0.43  0.28  0.44  0.29  
  - 3-4 0.2  0.31  0.18  0.29   
  - 5 and more 0.05  0.07  0.06  0.08   
R&D employment share (in %) 20.86 19.74 19.62 20.15 22.78 21.62 23.03 22.61
R&D performed occasionally 0.27  0.31  0.31  0.36   
R&D performed permanently 0.6  0.49  0.56  0.41   
Window of Opportunity          
  Larger than 1 year 0.53  0.59  0.53  0.6  
  Unknown 0.23  0.23  0.22  0.26   
High Degree of Customisation 0.3  0.35  0.32  0.3   
Age of Product 5.36 2.52 5.34 2.21 5.18 2.51 5.05 2.22
Share of Best Selling Products:         
  - 30-60% 0.37  0.38  0.36  0.36  
  - 60-80% 0.30  0.32  0.32  0.38   
  - 80-100% 0.12  0.13  0.13  0.13   
Capital good 0.35  0.51  0.34  0.51   
Intermediate good / service 0.33  0.2  0.31  0.16   
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Appendix D Regression Models 
Table D-1:  
Propensity of Internationalisation – Results using a Probit Model 
 Whole Sample UK Germany 
 Number of obs = 528 Number of obs = 350 Number of obs = 178 
 LL = -258,2 LL = -159,8 LL = -93,07 
 chi2(25) = 157,1 chi2(20) = 116,09 chi2(21) = 49,63 
 Pseudo R2 (1) = 0,233 Pseudo R2 (1) = 0,266 Pseudo R2 (1) = 0,211 
 correct classified:  
77,5 % 
correct classified:  
79.4 % 
correct classified: 75,8 % 
 max chance: 66,5 % max chance: 68.57 % max chance: 62.4 % 
 Marginal  
Effects 
t  Marginal  
Effects 
t  Marginal  
Effects 
t  
West-Germany 0.2074 2.47 **       
East-Germany 0.0453 0.47     -0.2389 -2.53 ** 
ICT-Hardware 0.1533 2.49 ** 0.1919 2.74 *** 0.0520 0.43  
Engineering 0.2080 3.34 *** 0.2136 2.87 *** 0.1623 1.39  
Bio/Med/Life 0.2029 2.77 *** 0.2050 2.49 ** 0.1810 1.22  
Other Industries 0.1436 2.43 ** 0.1094 1.54  0.1921 1.69 * 
Log(No. empl. start up) 0.1089 3.67 *** 0.0967 2.63 *** 0.1037 1.92 * 
Log(Age) 0.2178 4.51 *** 0.2381 4.17 *** 0.1427 1.50  
R&D occasionally 0.0055 0.08  -0.0193 -0.22  0.0228 0.17  
R&D permanent 0.1206 1.58  0.0386 0.43  0.2383 1.69 * 
R&D intensity 0.0027 1.69 * 0.0039 1.88 * 0.0012 0.43  
Experience abroad 0.1145 2.32 ** 0.0938 1.65 * 0.1464 1.50  
Experience in MNC 0.1542 3.33 *** 0.1522 2.79 *** 0.1570 1.78 * 
Education abroad 0.0461 0.65  0.1202 1.36  -0.0754 -0.62  
Product technology UK          
New combin. of ex.tech 0.1670 2.38 ** 0.1605 2.31 **    
New tech. devel. elsew. 0.1999 2.46 ** 0.1869 2.35 **    
New tech.devel.Inhouse 0.1514 2.07 ** 0.1371 1.80 *    
Product technology FRG          
New combin.of ex.tech -0.0904 -0.76     -0.0775 -0.60  
New tech. devel.elsew. -0.2559 -2.05 **    -0.2271 -1.74 * 
New tech.devel Inhouse -0.0338 -0.34     -0.0262 -0.22  
Intense product custom. -0.1654 -3.32 *** -0.2129 -3.49 *** -0.0724 -0.79  
Consumer good -0.1618 -2.06 ** -0.1820 -2.09 ** -0.1332 -0.70  
Ready to use product -0.0968 -2.12 ** -0.0983 -1.80 ** -0.1159 -1.37  
Shortage in competencies          
Sale/Marketing -0.0393 -1.52  -0.0414 -1.40  -0.0305 -0.57  
Production/R&D -0.0099 -0.31  -0.0217 -0.57  -0.0036 -0.06  
* 10 % level of significance; **  5 % level of significance; ***  1 % level of significance 
 (1) McFaddens R2  
Base category = software firm without regular R&D activities selling “tried and tested technology” 
Source: LBS/ZEW 1998 
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Table D-2:  
Probability of International Sales 
Using the Number of Market Entries as the Threshold in a Multinomial Logit Model 
Base category:  
No international sales 
Number of obs = 528 
Chi2(50) = 216.80 
Log Likelihood=-409.15 
Pseudo R2=0.2095 
 less than three market entries at least three market entries 
Exogenous variables Coefficient asym.t  Coefficient asym.t  
West-Germany -0.188 -0.24  1.765 3.43 *** 
East-Germany -1.060 -1.27  0.687 1.32  
ICT-Hardware 0.549 1.18  0.904 2.48 ** 
Engineering 0.683 1.30  1.390 3.49 *** 
Bio/Med/Life 1.090 1.82 * 1.285 2.67 *** 
Other Industries 0.783 1.86 * 0.729 2.12  
Log(No. employees start up) 0.219 1.04  0.687 4.18 *** 
Log(Age) 0.863 2.62 *** 1.163 4.37 *** 
R&D occasionally -0.345 -0.74  0.367 0.86  
R&D permanent -0.351 -0.71  1.125 2.61 ** 
R&D intensity 0.015 1.39  0.014 1.56  
Experience abroad 0.308 0.94  0.728 2.73 *** 
Experience in MNC 0.740 2.36 ** 0.800 3.18 *** 
Education abroad -0.123 -0.23  0.488 1.23  
Product technology UK      
New combin.of exist. tech. 1.124 2.28 ** 0.817 1.90 * 
New tech. devel. Elsewhere 1.248 2.01 ** 1.115 2.07 ** 
New tech. devel. In-house 0.812 1.54  0.841 1.95 ** 
Product technology FRG      
New combin.of exist. tech. -0.051 -0.05  -0.684 -1.18  
New tech devel. Elsewhere 0.317 0.37  -1.791 -2.77 *** 
New tech. devel. In-house 0.550 0.63  -0.457 -0.88  
Intense product customisation -0.364 -1.14  -0.978 -3.73 *** 
Consumer good -0.590 -1.20  -0.866 -2.20 ** 
Ready to use product -0.416 -1.35  -0.519 -2.10 ** 
Shortage in competencies      
 Sale/Marketing 0.132 0.78  -0.330 -2.37 ** 
 Production/R&D -0.196 -0.90  0.007 0.04  
Constant -3.405 -3.80 *** -4.752 -6.17 *** 
* 10 % level of significance 
**   5 % level of significance 
***   1 % level of significance 
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Table D-3:  
Probability of International Sales Based on the Degree of Internationalisation as the Threshold 
- in a Multinomial Logit  Model - 
Base category:  
No international sales 
Number of obs = 528 
Chi2(50) = 186.82 
Log Likelihood=-439.91 
Pseudo R2=0.1751 
 less than 10% foreign sales at least 10% foreign sales 
Exogenous variables Coefficient z  Coefficient z  
West-Germany 1.276 2.219 ** 1.159 2.254 ** 
East-Germany 0.755 1.307  -0.168 -0.308  
ICT-Hardware 0.403 0.918  1.021 2.806 *** 
Engineering 0.809 1.692 * 1.440 3.589 *** 
Bio/Med/Life 0.618 1.046  1.532 3.175 *** 
Other Industries 0.440 1.095  0.927 2.682 *** 
Log(No. employees  start up) 0.490 2.626 *** 0.580 3.567 *** 
Log(Age) 0.841 2.655 *** 1.182 4.494 *** 
R&D occasionally 0.025 0.052  0.064 0.156  
R&D permanent 0.430 0.891  0.690 1.670 * 
R&D intensity 0.012 1.192  0.015 1.694 * 
Experience abroad 0.446 1.388  0.667 2.536 ** 
Experience in MNC 0.492 1.625  0.918 3.678 *** 
Education abroad 0.424 0.924  0.296 0.747  
Product technology UK     
New combin.of exist. tech. 0.680 1.364  1.022 2.439 ** 
New tech.devel. Elsewhere 0.455 0.668  1.436 2.748 *** 
New tech.devel. In-house 0.455 0.886  0.925 2.182 ** 
Product technology FRG     
New combin.of exist. tech. -0.857 -1.233  -0.248 -0.415  
New tech.devel. elsewhere -1.567 -2.057 ** -0.992 -1.566  
New tech.devel. Inhouse -0.372 -0.640  -0.052 -0.097  
Intense product customisation -0.543 -1.769  -0.873 -3.372 *** 
Consumer good -0.529 -1.155  -0.904 -2.294 ** 
Ready to use product -0.659 -2.240 ** -0.417 -1.694 * 
Shortage in competencies     
 Sale/Marketing -0.158 -0.947  -0.195 -1.426  
 Production/R&D 0.070 0.339  -0.106 -0.608  
Constant -3.682 -4.250 *** -4.511 -6.029 *** 
* 10 % level of significance 
**   5 % level of significance 
***   1 % level of significance 
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Table D-4:  
The Degree of Internationalisation (Share of Non-Domestic Revenues)  
–  OLS Regression Model – 
(subsample of internationalisers only) 
 TOTAL UK GERMANY 
 Number of obs=335 Number of obs=229 Number of obs=106 
 F(23,314)=7.48 F(18,210)=7.32 F(19,86)=2.41 
 Prob>F=0.0000 Prob>F=0.0000 Prob>F=0.0031 
 R-squared=0.2608 R-squared=0.2817 R-squared=0.2529 
int_sh Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  
East-Germany -17.274 -2.996 ***   -5.920 -0.968  
West-Germany -9.384 -2.486 **     
Log(No. employees at start up) 0.153 0.080  -2.380 -0.946  0.747 0.240  
R&D intensity 0.256 2.317 ** 0.364 2.622 *** 0.196 1.195  
Years since first int.sales 3.019 4.623 *** 2.914 3.714 *** 3.580 3.042 *** 
ICT-Hardware 5.535 1.129  6.821 1.150  3.083 0.349  
Engineering 11.811 2.378 ** 9.474 1.422  18.468 2.185 ** 
Bio/Med/Life 13.930 2.385 ** 14.005 2.059 ** 16.703 1.668 * 
Other Industries 8.907 1.824 * 9.667 1.463  8.929 1.245  
Internat. in Business Plan 15.543 4.735 *** 21.252 5.085 *** 4.957 0.942  
International R&D co-operation  
prior to entry 
14.581 3.146 *** 14.470 1.975 ** 13.292 2.038 ** 
Product technology       
New combination of exist. tech 7.699 1.699 * 11.997 2.088 ** -7.097 -0.944  
New tech. developed Elsewhere 11.192 1.984 ** 14.435 2.001 ** -3.340 -0.378  
New tech.developed  
In-house 
3.562 0.842  3.936 0.714  -0.840 -0.122  
Shortage in competencies       
Sale/Marketing -1.667 -0.947  -2.127 -0.997  -0.314 -0.094  
Production/R&D -0.977 -0.393  -2.300 -0.748  0.076 0.019  
Capital good 2.977 0.869  2.635 0.591  10.536 1.882 * 
Intermediate good -1.195 -0.321  2.980 0.666  -10.001 -1.689 * 
VC at start-up 9.470 1.755 * 8.382 1.499  26.262 1.914 * 
Public grant at start-up -0.636 -0.171  -0.440 -0.082  2.418 0.467  
Constant -6.441 -0.939  -11.599 -1.344  -11.640 -1.138  
* 10 % level of significance 
**   5 % level of significance 
***   1 % level of significance 
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Table D-5:  
The Degree of Internationalisation (Share of Non-Domestic Revenues)  
- Generalised Tobit Model – 
(Entire Sample of Internationalisers and Domestic Firms) 
 TOTAL UK GERMANY 
 Number of obs = 520 Number of obs = 345 Number of obs = 175 
 LL = - 1680.12 LL = - 1155.7 LL = -509.17 
 chi2(18) = 390.42 chi2(17) = 265.16 chi2(18) = 137.31 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 Pseudo R2 = 0.104 Pseudo R2 = 0.1029 Pseudo R2 = 0.1189 
int_sh Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  
East-Germany -13.536 -2.414 **   -5.334 -0.991  
West-Germany -6.662 -1.780 *      
Log(No. employees start up) 2.239 1.230  1.288 0.531  1.119 0.419  
R&D intensity 0.405 16.852 *** 0.520 4.137 *** 0.228 1.703 * 
Years since first int. sales 9.049 4.267 *** 9.175 13.945 *** 8.512 9.085 *** 
ICT-Hardware 10.694 2.361 ** 12.746 2.229 ** 6.112 0.871  
Engineering 19.343 4.094 *** 18.670 3.025 *** 22.118 3.194 *** 
Bio/Med/Life 18.989 3.440 *** 19.290 2.758 *** 20.985 2.489 ** 
Other Industries 14.152 3.064 *** 17.405 2.804 *** 8.538 1.326  
Product technology        
New combin.of exist. tech. 11.103 2.546 ** 19.322 3.416 *** -9.561 -1.370  
New tech. devel. Elsewhere 12.289 2.325 ** 22.995 3.282 *** -8.728 -1.092  
New tech. devel. In-house 7.886 1.879 * 12.361 2.152 ** 0.286 0.049  
Shortage in competencies        
Sale/Marketing -3.703 -2.199 ** -4.567 -2.226 ** -0.747 -0.261  
Production/R&D 1.061 0.475  1.180 0.423  0.255 0.074  
Capital good 3.209 1.007  1.342 0.323  10.890 2.280 * 
Intermediate good 1.056 0.290  4.197 0.918  -9.405 -1.595  
VC at start up 13.771 2.678 *** 15.863 2.667 *** 0.961 0.088  
Public grant at start up 2.935 0.776  4.216 0.789  4.569 0.930  
Constant -45.935 -7.685 *** -55.079 -6.960 *** -36.510 -4.257 *** 
* 10 % level of significance 
**   5 % level of significance 
***   1 % level of significance 
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Table D-6:  
Hazard Function Results for the Timing of Internationalisation 
 Cox regression - Exponential regres-
sion 
Weibull regression 
 
Exogenous variables 
Coefficient Asymptotic
t-values 
Coefficient Asymptotic 
 t-values 
Coefficient Asymptotic 
t-values 
West-Germany 0.6856 2.96 0.6841 2.95 0.7735 2.69 
East-Germany 0.3053 1.23 0.3188 1.29 0.4122 1.38 
ICT-Hardware 0.2580 1.70 0.2650 1.74 0.2858 1.57 
Engineering 0.3864 2.50 0.3865 2.50 0.4230 2.26 
Bio/Med/Life 0.4610 2.81 0.4587 2.78 0.5270 2.59 
Other Industries 0.2333 1.57 0.2317 1.55 0.2441 1.37 
Log(No. employees start up) 0.2002 3.11 0.1973 3.09 0.2239 2.79 
R&D occasionally 0.4042 1.87 0.4095 1.90 0.5164 2.08 
R&D permanent 0.4875 2.25 0.4853 2.24 0.5366 2.14 
R&D intensity -0.0003 -0.17 -0.0001 -0.06 0.0001 0.03 
Product technology UK       
   New combin. of exist. tech 0.3006 1.59 0.3088 1.63 0.3267 1.46 
   New tech. devel.. Elsewhere 0.4448 2.05 0.4541 2.11 0.5017 1.95 
   New tech. devel. In-house 0.3550 1.91 0.3614 1.94 0.3765 1.70 
Product technology  FRG       
   New combin. of exist. tech -0.0836 -0.34 -0.0784 -0.32 -0.1026 -0.33 
   New tech. devel. Elsewhere -0.4030 -1.32 -0.4052 -1.32 -0.4585 -1.28 
   New tech. devel. In-house -0.1532 -0.67 -0.1525 -0.66 -0.2141 -0.74 
Experience abroad 0.2717 2.53 0.2753 2.57 0.3227 2.42 
Experience in MNC 0.4379 4.38 0.4500 4.54 0.5531 4.49 
Education abroad 0.0544 0.38 0.0504 0.35 0.0526 0.29 
Shortage in competencies             
   Sale/Marketing -0.1006 -1.85 -0.0939 -1.73 -0.1050 -1.58 
   Production/R&D -0.0790 -1.07 -0.0821 -1.12 -0.1142 -1.30 
Intense product customisation -0.4318 -3.59 -0.4317 -3.57 -0.5234 -3.57 
Consumer good -0.2168 -1.29 -0.2196 -1.31 -0.2139 -1.08 
Ready to use product -0.2662 -2.63 -0.2692 -2.67 -0.3263 -2.65 
Shape-Parameter          
   log (α)      0.3565 10.72 
   α       1.43  
Summary statistics:    
No of observations 521 521 521 
χ2 against constant only   131.13 137.78 123.09 
Log. Likelihood -1993.15 -606.24 -576.31 
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Table D-7:  
Productivity and International Business Activities 
Endogenous Variable:  
Labour Productivity 
Model (1) 
IV estimation 
Full Model 
Model (2) 
IV estimation  
Without industry 
effects 
Model (3) 
Weighted IV 
Without industry 
effects 
Model (4) 
LAD estimation 
Without industry 
effects 
Exogenous Variables Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
West Germany 0.802 2.33*** 0.583 3.32*** 0.506 3.08*** 0.490 3.04*** 
East Germany 0.716 2.02** 0.479 2.49*** 0.417 2.37*** 0.342 1.99** 
ICT-Hardware 0.241 2.17*** - - - - - - 
Engineering 0.106 1.17 - - - - - - 
Bio/Med/Life 0.190 1.01 - - - - - - 
Other Industries 0.108 0.82 - - - - - - 
log (Capital intensity) 0.642 1.94** 0.430 2.60*** 0.314 2.02*** 0.349 2.28*** 
log (R&D intensity) 0.120 2.80*** 0.119 2.91*** 0.161 4.78*** 0.148 4.43*** 
Dummy: R&D>0 
-
0.005 -0.06 -0.004 -0.05 -0.063 -0.80 0.013 0.16 
log (non R&D employment ) 
-
0.174 -2.60*** -0.154 -2.93*** -0.081 -2.01*** -0.108 -2.76*** 
International Sales 0.410 2.92*** 0.485 3.64*** 0.518 4.40*** 0.386 3.32*** 
Venture Capital  0.351 2.08*** 0.333 1.92*** 0.419 2.42*** 0.416 2.47*** 
Public Grants 
-
0.108 -0.52 0.001 0.01 -0.170 -1.07 -0.228 -1.45 
Constant 9.735 8.72*** 10.481 18.85*** 
10.82
4 20.60*** 10.781 20.90*** 
Industries: F(4,506)/p-value 1.50 0.20 - - - - - - 
Summary statistics: 
-  Number of observations  
-  R² / R² / Pseudo- R² 
-  F(13,506) / F(9,510) 
 
520 
0.167 
9.08 
 
520 
0.156 
12.18 
 
520 
- 
12.96 
 
520 
0.110 
- 
Specification Tests 
  Heteroscedasticity test 1) 
  χ2 (1) / p-value 0.35 0.55 0.36 0.54 - - - - 
  Functional form test 2) 
  F(18,488) / p-value 1.51 0.08 1.47 0.10 - - - - 
* 10 % level of significance 
**   5 % level of significance 
***   1 % level of significance 
Note: 1) Cook-Weisberg test using powers of the fitted values  
 2) Ramsey Reset test using powers of the exogenous variables 
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Table D-8:  
Sales and Employment Growth Regressions – Instrumental Variable Estimates 
 Sales Growth Employment Growth 
Exogenous variables Coeff. Asy. t- value* Coeff. Asy. t- value* 
West-Germany -0.061 -1.98 -0.020 -1.09 
East-Germany 0.037 0.68 -0.011 -0.43 
log (Age) -0.406 -6.30 -0.229 -6.40 
log(Sales first financial year) -0.132 -7.55 -0.121 -12.46 
Number of Founders: 
    2-3 
 
0.045 
 
1.55 
 
0.009 
 
0.53 
    3-4 0.120 2.93 0.036 1.90 
    5 and more 0.190 2.29 0.031 0.90 
Shortage in competencies: 
    Sale/Marketing 0.010 
 
0.67 
 
-0.001 -0.08 
    Production/R&D 0.018 1.05 0.014 1.36 
Permanent R&D 0.064 2.35 0.022 1.43 
Window of Opportunity: 
    larger than 1 year -0.014 
 
-1.43 
 
-0.031 -1.64 
    not known -0.038 -1.94 -0.049 -2.27 
log (Age of Product) -0.054 -1.89 Not included 
Share of Best Selling Product: 
    30-60% 0.053 
 
1.65 
 
Not included 
    60-80% 0.076 2.06   
    80-100% 0.116 2.23   
Venture Capital  0.056 0.67 0.044 0.97 
Public Grants 0.024 0.29 0.052 1.30 
International Sales 0.291 2.87 0.080 1.41 
Constant 1.119 10.33 0.784 12.84 
Summary statistics: 
  Number of observations  
  R² 
503 
0.25 
 
528 
0.36 
Specification Tests 
  Functional Form Reset Test 1 
     F(24, 459) / p-value 1.14 / 0.30 
 
 
0.60 / 0.92 
  Heteroscedasticity 2 
     χ ² / p-value 131.15 / 0.00 
 
50.10 / 0.00 
* based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
1) Cook-Weisberg tst using powers of the exogenous variables 
Ramsey Reset test using powers of the exogenous variables 
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Table D-9:  
Probit-Regression Models for Generating Instruments  
 
Model 1 
International Sales 
Model 2 
Venture Capital 
Model 3 
Public Grants 
Variables Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
West-Germany 0,161 1,073  -0,158 -0,758  -0,204 -1,210  
East-Germany -0,456 -2,236 *** 0,303 1,102  0,733 3,637 *** 
ICT-Hardware 0,278 1,569  -0,045 -0,192  0,506 2,585 *** 
Engineering 0,362 1,876 ** -0,605 -2,397 *** 0,385 1,852 ** 
Bio/Med/Life 0,511 2,319 *** 0,311 1,112  0,468 1,810 ** 
Other Industries 0,037 0,231  -0,397 -1,722 * 0,281 1,426  
Startup Year:       
 - 90/92 -0,247 -1,703 ** -0,182 -0,899  -0,396 -2,323 *** 
 - 93/96 -1,228 -7,355 *** -0,237 -1,089  -0,294 -1,639 * 
Number of Employees at start-up 0,083 1,059  0,048 0,499  0,044 0,444  
Number of Founders: 
 - 2-3 -0,052 -0,354
 
- -
 
-0,325 -1,992 ** 
 - 3-4 0,321 1,860 ** - -  -0,351 -1,790 ** 
 - 5 and more 0,086 0,308  - -  -0,536 -1,602 * 
Experience abroad 0,252 1,909 ** - -  - -  
Experience in MNC 0,350 2,769 *** - -  - -  
Education abroad 0,054 0,301  - -  - -  
Venture Capital at start-up   1,795 8,040 *** - -  
Public Subsidy at start-up   - -  1,268 8,113 *** 
Shortage in competencies at start-
up: 
 - Sale/Marketing -0,021 -0,312
 
-0,178 -1,781 ** 0,180 2,216 *** 
 - Production/R&D -0,066 -0,738  -0,040 -0,363  0,049 0,517  
Constant -0,271 -1,413  -1,361 -5,585  -1,074 -5,001  
Summary statistics: 
 - Number of observations 
 - McFaddens Pseudo R² 
 - Wald  χ² against model with con-
stant only 
 
528 
0,1600 
102,06 
 
528 
0,2350 
79,46 
 
528 
0,2079 
110,73 
* 10 % level of significance 
**   5 % level of significance 
***   1 % level of significance 
 
 
